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This thesis provides background information on the once-cancelled V-22 program and
acquisition reform and then examines the impact of the latter on the former. It analyzes the V-22
program using DoD's "ten guiding principles of acquisition reform" as a standard and concludes
that acquisition reform is having mixed results on this Major Defense Acquisition Program.
Much is being accomplished with acquisition reform in the V-22 program. A
transformation of the business process from the top down is enabling the program office and its
prime contractors to optimize cost, schedule, and performance. Earned value management
metrics are actively being incorporated into the program's risk management process. Concurrent
contractor/Government testing and maintenance reduces test time required by 72 percent. Cross-
functional IPTs, as the backbone of the program, are breaking down "stove pipes" and
facilitating concurrent engineering. Successfully implementing initiatives like CAIV and CLS
and focusing on overall cost of ownership are reducing the cost of the program from cradle to
grave. Commercial products and processes, like the Allison AE-1107C engine and CATIA
software, are providing high quality systems at market controlled prices. Commercial item
acquisition and CLS are being used effectively to minimize life cycle costs. "Win-Win"
contracting with industry is providing engine reliability that should improve with time and save
30 percent in support costs.
Much can be accomplished still. Realistic contingency funding should be included in
fiscal budgets to eliminate the migration of funds from R&D and PROC to O&S. SPI should be
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A. AREA OF RESEARCH
The nation's procurement process has evolved over the years to the present
system structured under acquisition reform initiatives. The purpose of this research paper
is to determine the degree of positive or negative impact acquisition reform has had on a
Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) that has evolved with the process and to
make recommendations based on the lessons learned.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What are the effects of acquisition reform on PMA-275, the Bell Boeing Tiltrotor
Team, and Allison in the execution and delivery of the V-22 Osprey?
2. Secondary Research Questions
a. What are the background and history of the V-22 Osprey Program?
b. What are the history and principles of acquisition reform and why
are they important?
c. How have PMA-275 and the contractor teams applied acquisition
reform to the V-22 Osprey program?
d. How are the effects of acquisition reform measured in the Osprey
program?
e. What are the future implications of acquisition reform on the V-22
Osprey program?
C. DISCUSSION
The V-22 Osprey is currently a major defense acquisition program (MDAP)
designed to fulfill the medium vertical lift requirements within the United States Marine
Corps, U. S. Air Force and U.S. Navy in the early twenty-first century. It is a unique
aircraft in that it incorporates tilt-rotor technology. This technology involves the rotating
of rotors from a position similar to that of a helicopter to one similar to a turbo-prop
airplane. Vertical lift is provided in the first rotor position and great speed is
accomplished in the second. The services foresee a bright future for this cutting-edge
technology in tomorrow's battlespace, but the V-22's past has been anything but bright.
Though the V-22 was exciting new technology and already through Milestones 0,
I, and II of the acquisition process, the Osprey program was officially cancelled. This
occurred during Fiscal Year (FY) 1990 budget disputes presided over by then Secretary
of Defense Cheney. Only a slight amount of congressional "plus-up" support kept the
program alive until the new administration restored it to the President's FY- 1993 budget.
Along with the new administration came a "new way of doing business" in
acquisition. Defense Secretary William Perry ushered a new approach to acquisition
reform in March of 1 994 as he set out to streamline the way the Department of Defense
(DoD) did business. Innovative approaches to procurement and business relationships
were encouraged in an effort to break the perceived status quo of overpriced and late
systems procurements. Acquisition reform was initiated with a four-page memorandum
and later cemented with changes to the DoD Directive 5000. 1 and 5000.2-R in March of
1996.
The V-22 Osprey was resuscitated and took life under the programs of acquisition
reform. The new Osprey has greater performance, lighter weight and 20 percent less
flyaway cost. It is now listed among the Navy's top "success stories" and was nominated
for the David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award.
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
This thesis is a case study that analyzes the acquisition reform initiatives in place
at the program office (PMA-275) and with the Osprey's Prime Contractors. Though
acquisition reform has broad application, each program is unique. The researcher
identifies and explains the roles and responsibilities of those involved in this program and
analyzes the degree to which reform is taking place. The extent of reform's impact on the
V-22 program is gauged by DoD's ten principles of acquisition reform: 1) empower
people to manage—not avoid risk, 2) operate in integrated product teams, 3) reduce cycle
time by 50 percent, 4) reduce cost of ownership, 5) expand use of commercial products
and processes, 6) use performance specifications and non-Government standards, 7) issue
solicitations that reflect the qualities of a world class buyer, 8) procure goods and services
with "best value" techniques, 9) test and inspect in the least obstructive manner to add
value to the process or product, and 10) manage contracts for end results.
E. THE V-22 OSPREY
The V-22 Osprey is a tri-service aircraft that will utilize tiltrotor technology to
accomplish missions more effectively than currently available aviation systems. It will
provide self-deployable Marine Corps, Air force and Navy support worldwide. It meets
or exceeds all of the following key military requirements:
U. S. Marine Corps:
• Combat assault, ship and land based
• 24 troop, 371 km (200nm) radius of action
• External cargo capacity
U. S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM):
• Special operations
• 18 troop insertion/extraction to 927 km (500nm) radius of action
U. S. Navy:
• Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) to 890 km (480nm) radius of action
• Special Warfare team insertion/extraction
• Logistics supply to ships at sea [Ref. 19:p. 1-16]
What enables the V-22 to accomplish these missions? A brief discussion of the
V-22 flight envelope and lift performance, unique wing and "twist capsule" structure,
powerplant, aircraft survivability features, environmental control systems, avionics, and
use of composite material technology will give the reader a solid appreciation for the
aircraft.
The aircraft flight envelope and payload capacity are unique. The performance
results of the V-22 listed in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the ability of this vertical lift




VTOL capability but twice as fast
as a helicopter
• The tiltrotor's speed expands
rotorcraft capabilities beyond the
limits of helicopter technology
300 350
Figure 1.1, V-22 Flight Envelope [Ref. 19:p. 1-3]
Speed, when coupled with the V-22's
supenor range and payload, yields a
significant increase in productivity,
compared to conventional helicopters.
200 400 600 800 1.000 1,200 1,400
Range - nmi
Figure 1.2, V-22 Payload and Range [Ref. 19:p. 1-4]
The V-22 Osprey's configuration is like no other aircraft. As depicted in Figure
1.3 at the end of this chapter, the aircraft is roughly 57 feet long, 84 feet wide and 22 feet
high. The nacelles are positioned at the tip of each wing and contain the engine, gearbox,
swashplates and 38-foot diameter proprotors. The nacelles can rotate at a rate of eight
degrees per second from the 90-degree flight position through the 0-degree hover position
to aft 7.5 degree for deceleration. This allows for full conversion performance in just
over 1 seconds. The wings themselves rotate about a "twist capsule" within 90 seconds
for shipboard handling and storage. Nearly 2,000 wires pass through this capsule
enabling the aircraft's triply redundant "fly by wire" control system to perform.
The engines are Allison AE-1107C turboshafts that produce 6,150 horsepower
each. These engines enable the aircraft to achieve a cruise speed of 275 knots and a
maximum airspeed of 305 knots, or 363 miles per hour. The aircraft can lift external
payloads up to 10,000 pounds or carry internal loads up to 300 pounds per square foot.
Its maximum flight altitude is approximately 28,000 feet.
There are numerous survivability features in the V-22. The aircraft incorporates
self-sealing fuel tanks. The proprotors, with lower end tip velocity, are inherently quieter
than helicopter rotors. This enables tactical surprise. As well, the V-22 is equipped with
crashworthy armored seats and armor plating surrounds aircraft vital areas.
An effective environmental control system provides cabin pressurization and
overpressurization for Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) protection and climate control
for the cockpit and avionics areas. Also, oxygen is generated for flight above 10,000 feet
and the nitrogen byproduct is used to make inert empty spaces in the fuel sponsons.
The cockpit is equipped with state-of-the-art avionics. All systems are integrated
into a two-mission computer "glass cockpit" incorporating multi-functional displays for
flight and navigation purposes and control display units for power plant, electrical and
other information. Numerous electronic Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) are
incorporated, as well.
Multi-layer glass and composite laminate material technology delivers needed
functional performance and great strength. One application is incorporated into the V-
22
's windscreen which is designed in several layers. One layer protects avionics from
electromagnetic pulses. Another layer protects the screen from icing. A third layer is
built to withstand a 3 1 -pound birdstrike at 275 knots. Other sections of the aircraft, like
the fuel sponsons, are composite laminates that offer great strength with little weight. All
told, the airframe is 43 percent composite laminate materials.
With an abbreviated understanding of the missions and characteristics of the V-
22, the history of battles fought thus far in its acquisition will be addressed in the next
chapter.
Aircraft Characteristics
Length 57 ft 4 in
Width 84 ft 7 in
Height 22 ft 1 in
Folded length 63f10m
Folded width 18 ft 5 in
Folded height 18 ft 1 in
Rotor diameter 38 ft 1 in
Power 2x6,150shp
Empty weight 33.1401b
Maximum VTO weight (sl/std) 52.870 lb
Short takeoff weight 57,000 lb
Self-deployment weight 60,500 lb
Maximum fuel capacity 2,037 gal
Cabin length x width x height 290 in x 72 in x 72 in
Cabin provisions 24 troops or 12 litters
Rescue hoist capacity 600 lb
Cargo floor limit 300 psl
Cruise speed (3,000 ft/91.5"F) 275 ktas
Maximum speed (15.000 ft/45°F) 305ktas
















Figure 1.3, V-22 Diagram [Ref.: 19:p. 1-6]
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II. PROGRAM HISTORY
With the onset of what promises to be a turbulent twenty first century, the Navy,
Marine Corps and Air Force have developed strategies that require the operational
capabilities of a special aircraft, the V-22 Osprey. Combat search and rescue, over-the-
horizon amphibious assault and long range clandestine infiltration and exfiltration require
advanced vertical/ short take-off vertical landing (V/STOVL) tiltrotor technology.
Though much of "Joint Vision 2010" strategy rests on the soon-to-arrive V-22, the
aircraft and its decisive-edge were almost squandered numerous times by a system highly
susceptible to budgetary and political shortsightedness.
This chapter examines the history of this Major Defense Acquisition Program
(MDAP) to provide the reader with the program background and an insight into just how
complex the acquisition arena can become. First discussed is the early development of
tiltrotor technology. The recognition of a valid military requirement that could be
satisfied by this technology and the establishment of the program is covered next. The
third section covers the successful efforts to keep the program alive amidst the carnage of
post Cold War budget cuts. The last section briefly covers the program's development
from 1992 to present.
As the history of the program unfolds in this chapter, the reader is encouraged to
note the degree of funding instability. In a presentation to the Program Management
Seminar at the Naval Postgraduate School, Mr. Dan Celesniak, Director of DoD
Acquisition Integration, stated that the largest hindrance to true reform in DoD is the
funding instability inherent in the budget process. This case study conclusively
demonstrates this point.
A. TILTROTOR TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Though the helicopter achieved satisfactory vertical take-off and landing (VTOL)
performance, engineers and inventors were not satisfied with the aircraft's limited range
and speed. Useful as it was, the helicopter was only capable of certain speeds due to
retreating rotor blade stall and other aerodynamic limitations. Vertical/Short Take off and
Landing (V/STOL) options provided a possible area to explore.
As necessity is the mother of invention, the best and brightest around the world
raced for the solution. The first conceptual tiltrotor design was the British Baynes
Heliplane, patented in 1937. [Ref. l:p. 108] However, it was never developed. Heinrich
Foche then designed his Fa-269 as part of the German war effort. It too, was never
developed. [Ref. 2:p.l76-177] It was not until 1945 that development of a tiltrotor took
place. Americans Robert Lichten and Mario Guerierri developed their Transcendental
Model 1-G under Air Force and Army sponsorship. Model 1-G's first flight was in July
of 1954, and eventually, it was able to rotate its rotors 70 degrees forward of the
horizontal and achieve airspeeds of 1 15 miles per hour. [Ref. 3:p.73]
The Bell XV-3 was built in 1955 for the Army and Air Force as a continuation of
the 1-G tiltrotor concept for possible V/STOL observation and reconnaissance use. Bell
had been designing possible tiltrotor aircraft concepts since the 1940's and this was the
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first that they actually developed. Below are the words of one the pioneers of tiltrotor
technology at Bell in the late 1940's.
Conceptually, this helicopter/airplane could go twice as far and go twice as
fast as a comparable sized helicopter—on the same amount of fuel. It
would have twin 3-bladed rotor systems mounted at the tips of each wing.
In the helicopter mode the rotor blades would rotate in a horizontal plane.
Then, during forward flight, the rotor hub would rotate in a vertical plane
like an airplane propeller. [Ref. 4:p.l]
The Bell XV-3 was the first tiltrotor aircraft to transfer fully from vertical to horizontal
flight. The XV-3 rotated its rotors 90 degrees for cruise flight on 17 December 1958.
The aircraft continued demonstrating concept feasibility testing until 1966. It flew 270
flights and accumulated 125 flight hours. [Ref. 5:p. 1]
The tiltwing concept was also developed as an alternative for V/STOL missions.
Back in 1956, Boeing began development of the world's first tiltwing aircraft. The VZ-2
made its maiden flight in 1958. [Ref. 15:p.l-24] The VZ-2 proved the tiltwing to be
effective in the airplane mode but demonstrated prohibitive challenges in other areas.
The chief problem with the tiltwing design was, and is, wing stall during conversion
flight mode. Though physically possible, a safe transition (vertical to horizontal flight or
vice versa) required flight within a very narrow envelope of propeller tilt angles.
Additionally, the tiltwing proved to be inefficient in a hover and at low speeds. [Ref.
15:p.l-13]
The Bell XV- 1 5 aircraft followed. It incorporated many of the lessons learned
from the earlier V/STOL efforts and demonstrated the maturity of tiltrotor technology.
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Bell was awarded a joint Army/NASA contract for the then Model 300 as a "proof of
concept" technology demonstrator program. As extensive improvements took place
during design, the aircraft was redesignated the Model 301 and later the XV- 15. [Ref.
2:p.l82] Two XV-15s were built. "Aircraft development, airworthiness testing, and the
basic 'proof of concept' testing were completed in September 1 979, and in October 1 980
the Government took delivery of its first tiltrotor, aircraft (N703), for continued research
testing." [Ref. 6:p.l]
Though successful, the initial XV- 15 effort was conceived as a low cost "proof-
of-concept" development program. This philosophy stymied any real improvement to
baseline systems designs and capabilities, "with changes permitted only if flight safety
were an issue." [Ref. 4:p. 1] Any real improvement to the tiltrotor would require a
serious interest by stakeholders in the acquisition arena and an increased perception of
need.
B. A PROGRAM IS BORN
The Honorable John Lehman, Jr., President Reagan's new Secretary of the Navy,
witnessed the aircraft's first public demonstration at the famous Paris Air Show in June
of 1981. He was keenly aware of his helicopters' inadequacy for long-range missions
similar to the failed "Desert One" hostage rescue attempt. The Navy needed a fast, long-
range vertical lift capability. The aging Navy and Marine Corps H-46 Sea Knight fleet
was in need of replacement soon, and the superior capabilities of the XV- 15 caught his
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eye. [Ref. 7] Secretary Lehman, recognizing a growing need, catapulted the tiltrotor from
"concept demonstrator" to possible "requirement filler."
Secretary Lehman's Navy was joined by the other services in documenting
medium lift vertical take off and landing (VTOL) capability needs. After reviewing the
FY- 1983 Program Objectives Memorandums (POM's), the Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) recommended a joint program be established
to minimize redundant efforts. Positive feedback by the services was received in October
of 1981. By December, the Joint Services Advanced Rotor Wing Development (JVX)
concept was defined and given approval (via memo) by the Deputy Secretary of Defense
with the Army as the executive service. [Ref. 8] Though no actual Joint Mission Need
Statement (MNS) was ever drafted, the services took the memo as a Milestone (MS 0)
decision and proceeded into concept exploration accordingly. [Ref. 9]
The mission need for the individual services was documented numerous times
prior to this MS decision. Its first appearance was in 1 969 in the Specific Operational
Requirement 14-2 IT; Vertical Assault Medium Transport (VMAT) published by the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). This document then evolved into the requirement for
the Marine Medium Transport Helicopter (HXM) in 1 974 and the Mission Element Need
Statement for the Marine Vertical Assault Transport (V/HXM) in 1981. The Air Force
also documented their need on 30 December 1981 with the "Special Operations
Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft," Tactical Air Forces Statement of Need 32-1382. [Ref.
8]
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Actions by the Government did not take place in a vacuum. Bell Helicopter
Textron recognized this as a strategic moment and initiated a program that was to prove
invaluable. The "Guest Pilot" program was kicked off on Halloween of 1 98 1 when Air
Force veteran Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) became the first public official to fly the
XV- 15 tiltrotor. Seeing is believing, and Senator Goldwater and other public officials
who followed him soon became tiltrotor advocates. [Ref. 4]
The Services each reprogrammed $1.5 million and met to establish joint mission
requirements and to explore available potential technologies in February of 1982. [Ref.
10:p. 22] The Joint Services Operational Requirement (JSOR) group met and established
ten mission areas that would later be accepted by the Service Secretaries in a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 4 June 1982. These mission requirements
were eventually validated:
Marine
• Amphibious assault troop lift
• Amphibious assault external lift
• Land assault troops
• Land assault external lift
Navy
• Combat Search and Rescue
• Special warfare
• Fleet Logistics
Army Special Electronic Missions/Tactical Mobility
14
Air Force Long Range Special Operations Force (SOF)
All services, worldwide self deployability [Ref.23]
The Joint Technical Assessment (JTA) group looked into five possible technology
alternatives. These ranged from minimal risk research and development to high-risk
research and development technologies. These technologies included:
1
.




5. Advancing Blade [Ref. 7]
The Government had clarified the need and the most probable technological solutions.
Bell and Boeing saw the opportunity to advance a tiltrotor solution for the
services. On 7 June 1982, they announced a teaming arrangement for the JVX
competition, and the following February this formidable duo's proposal would go
unchallenged. In December of 1982, the JTA group concluded that the tiltrotor was
indeed the best technology and the JSOR released similarly directed JVX suited
operational requirements. The JVX Program was thus established and entered into Phase
One. Not surprisingly, the Bell Boeing team was awarded the preliminary design
contract on 25 April 1983. [Ref. 4]
The Army's leadership days in the program were numbered. Back in the fall of
1982, the Army requested that the program be delayed. The response from the other
services resulted in the programs being adopted by the Navy. The Army financially
supported the program's development from the backseat until May of 1983. Other
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programs took priority and the Army pulled its RDT&E funding support. Though it
could not afford to assist in RDT&E, it still planned on procuring 231 aircraft in FY-
1993, which would ease production costs for the other services. [Ref. 1 1]
The Bell Boeing team submitted a JVX proposal for Full Scale Development
(FSD) in July of 1984 with IOC of December 1991. The contract negotiations were long
and difficult. Though there was quite a technological leap for the contractor, this FSD
contract was not of the standard "Cost Plus" format used to allow contractors financial
room to explore potentially risky technologies. At this time, the Army's infamous "Sgt.
York" air defense gun's failures and a $700.00 P3C Orion Toilet seat fed popular opinion
that defense industries took unfair advantage of the military's contracts [Ref.l2:p. 255].
Secretary Lehman insisted on "Fixed Price" contracts for all aircraft procurement unless
the program was extremely risky. A Pete Marwick, Mitchell, and Company analysis of
Navy contractors concluded that Boeing and the other top contractors were collecting 400
percent more return on assets for Navy contracts than commercial business and Secretary
Lehman was determined to stop "Uncle Sugar's" handouts [Ref. 12:p. 248]. This shifted
the risk back on the contractor, and as the pendulum had swung fully, gave Bell Boeing
little to no room financially to explore. [Ref.l2:p. 249]
The resultant contract was quite a challenge for Bell Boeing. The contract's
ceiling price was actually lower than both the Bell Boeing and Government estimates for
development. The contract required Bell and Boeing to set up separate production sites
and compete for eventual production. With this contract, the break-even point would
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occur after nine years. [Ref. 13] Additionally, the aircraft price was not to exceed (NTE)
$16.6 million per aircraft on the first 240 produced and Bell Boeing would fund the
production transition with no further Government assistance. [Ref. 14:p. 14] The FSD
contract was awarded on 2 May 1986, a day after the program passed its DSARC
Milestone II review, and included provisions for six FSD aircraft and an option for 12
pilot production aircraft.
According to Dick Spivey of Textron, the FSD contract's competition for
production clause was counterproductive. Whereas Bell and Boeing were sharing
information fully prior to the contract, distrust and paralysis after the contract slowed the
development effort significantly. Had the technology been appropriately classified as
somewhat risky and the production contract been sole source, the program would have
been better served. [Ref. 1 8]
Nonetheless, Bell Boeing was confident that they would recover their investments
in the long haul even if they exceeded the ceiling. In the unfunded time frame of the FSD
contract negotiation, Bell Boeing continued to invest in the program extensively.
Production capability was expanded and focused marketing continued. Major
subcontracts were awarded and a countrywide demonstration of the aircraft's capabilities
logged over 3,500 miles. [Ref. 7]
The XV- 15 Tiltrotor had gained worldwide recognition during its Paris Air Show
debut, and the V-22 now received attention from the United Kingdom, West Germany,
Japan and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). After visiting the V-22 Plant in
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Fort Worth, Texas, Japanese Minister of International Trade Hikaru Matsunaga stated "If
you produce this aircraft, I guarantee you we will buy it; If you do not, I guarantee you
we will build it [Ref. 15:p. 1]." Soon thereafter, Japanese Ishida Aerospace opened up a
plant in Ft. Worth, Texas, to design and develop the TW-68; a civil tiltwing V/STOVL
aircraft [Ref. 16:p.l]. The firm has since folded. In August of 1987, FAA Administrator
T.A. McArter took part in the "Guest Pilot" program, and the FAA soon established a
tiltrotor office and joined DoD in the V-22 development efforts in an effort to streamline
the tiltrotor certification process. Clearly, the tiltrotor's technology was revolutionary.
With the world's airport traffic problems, applications of military tiltrotor technology
would surely benefit civil aviation. This would soon become a two-way street as the
program encountered difficulties. The tiltrotor's commercial appeal and fostered political
support would prove to be essential. [Ref. 4]
With the end of the Reagan military buildup, the services tightened their purse
strings. The President's FY- 1988/89 budget submitted on 20 January 1987 included
funding for 913 V-22s. Broken down by service, the tally was: Marine Corps 552, Navy
50, Air Force 80 and Army 231. One year later, on 10 February 1988, the Army
announced that it would no longer be able to procure its 23 1 V-22s. Shortly thereafter, on
28 February 1988, the Air Force Special Operations Command reduced its total
requirement from 80 to 55. Mounting costs for the Army's LHX program (Commanche)
and Air Force's F-22 were absorbed by the V-22 funds. This lowered production to 657
aircraft and increased cost per aircraft accordingly. Though the Army could purchase the
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Osprey later on, the program would no longer have the Army's political clout or be able
to claim itself as "fully joint"— serving all four Services. [Ref. 17]
Through the end of 1988 and into January 1989, debate at all levels centered on
increased unit costs and the necessity of competition for production. As stated earlier,
Bell Boeing would have to run the original 913 aircraft production line for nine years just
to break even. In July, the Program Budget Decision (PBD) approved a sole source
funding profile submitted by the Program Office but failed to delete the requirement for
competition in production. In September, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
(USDA) was directed by the Joint Conference Committee (Congress) to determine if
competition was still appropriate. On 01 December 1988, Bell Boeing submitted a not to
exceed (NTE) cost for the FSD contract's 12 production aircraft pilot program option
reflecting an 18 percent increase in per-unit costs as a result of the lower quantities
produced. This lot proposal was for co-production by Bell and Boeing and not
competitive. On 1 4 June 1 989, the DoD Inspector general issued a report that chastised
the program's inability to assess correctly the tiltrotor technology risk and its associated
costs for dual sourcing. [Ref. 20 :p. 16] On 04 January 1989, Under Secretary of the Navy
Garrett responded by directing that the procurement be competitive but charged an
Independent Executive Review Team (IERT), chaired by RADM Vincent, to investigate
options. The debate and instability had a cost. Two weeks later, the V-22 Program
Manager, BGEN Blot, slipped the program one year due to conflicting guidance from the
chain of command and unanticipated test delays. [Ref. 17:p. 2]
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Bell Boeing continued to press on amidst the turmoil. The FSD option for 12
pilot aircraft was approved on 24 February 1989, and Bell Boeing geared up for long lead
production. The first flight of FSD aircraft number one took place on 19 March and
delivery of production aircraft was slated for 1992. Production lines would have to be set
up and personnel trained. However, just as the program was ramping up, it got cut. [Ref.
17:p.2]
C. THE FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL
On 12 April 1989 the Defense Resources Board (DRB) issued a tentative decision
to cancel the program. Secretary of Defense Cheney was faced with the task of cutting
$10 billion from the original budget request in order to comply with Gramm-Rudman
deficit ceilings for FY- 1990. His Director of Programs Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E),
Dr. Chu, had opposed the V-22 from its earliest days and released a report concluding
that a mix of conventional helicopters would be $9 billion less expensive than the new
Osprey alternative. Looking for "bang for the buck," Secretary Cheney favored strategic
over conventional forces. As the V-22 had just slipped a year and was arguably over
cost, it is no surprise that he cut the program. Secretary Cheney admired the capabilities
of the Osprey, but it was just too expensive.
The Navy responded. The V-22 was the Navy and Marine Corps' first acquisition
priority (officially) at the time and the Navy was quick to reclama the mark. (The A- 12
was a black program at the time and was the Navy's unofficial first priority.) However,
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the Navy and Marine efforts had little immediate effect as the DRB decided to cancel the
program the next day, 19 April 1989.
Congress had nurtured the program all along and the services, particularly the
Marine Corps, let their displeasure be known to key powerbrokers in the legislative
branch. The V-22 was produced in 45 of the 50 states. Secretary Cheney's decision
robbed congressional districts ofjobs and Congressmen of potential votes. A unanimous
"Sense of the Senate" resolution was immediately passed supporting the restoration of the
V-22 program [Ref. 17:p. 2]. The battle lines were drawn. The executive branch and
OSD wanted to kill the program; the Services and Congress wanted to keep it alive.
The response from the President took less than a week. On 25 April, the FY- 1990
Presidential Budget was forwarded to Congress. It recommended termination of the
Osprey program and included zero funding for FY- 1990 and out. [Ref. 17:p. 2]
Bell Boeing had invested a great deal of capital up front calculating that profit
would come later down the production line. Three days after the President released his
budget request, Bell Boeing announced that it would not be able to continue work on the
V-22 after 5 May unless the Government obligated an additional $130 million. However,
when 5 May arrived, Bell Boeing conceded that it would continue to work at its own risk
until 30 September.
Down but not out, Congress directed the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) to conduct a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA). The Institute
for Defense Analysis (IDA) was contracted and forecasted that the results would be
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available in December, 1989. The Office of the Secretary of Defense was further
instructed by Congress to include the results in the next year's FY- 1991 Presidential
Budget. [Ref. 17:p. 3]
With the end of the fiscal year came the end of Bell Boeing's commitment to fund
the program. On 2 October, PMA-275 announced it would fund the program
incrementally with FY- 1989 funds through the first quarter of FY- 1990 or until the FY-
1990 budget was signed. The FY- 1990 budget took some time before it was finally
signed, however.
The FY- 1990 budget wars continued for one and one half months until the budget
was finally signed on 13 November. OSD had mandated that all official Congressional
inquiries be routed through OSD back in June. However, unofficial channels were
opened and the services and contractors were able to influence congressional decision-
makers. The showdown came in the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). Its
chairman, Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), let the committee vote on all amendments as
a package and then offered the Secretary of Defense's budget as an alternative. Secretary
Cheney's budget needed a majority to be accepted but the vote resulted in a 16-16 tie
with the congressional version approved. The new budget authorized $255 million for V-
22 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), release of FY- 1989
Appropriations Procurement Navy (APN) funds for long lead production development,
and postponed the production funding decision until after the IDA study results were
released. [Ref. 17:p. 3]
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Bell Boeing was not sure the IDA would produce an unbiased report on the V-22.
The Director of IDA was Dr. Dean Simmons. Dr. Simmons had released a negative
report on the Army's LHX program, leading Bell Boeing to believe he might be biased
against the V-22, as well. As a result, Bell Boeing contracted with Lawrence Livermore
Labs and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to conduct a
separate independent analysis of the V-22. Using stochastic modeling and simulation,
NASA would be able to war-game the options and determine the most effective
alternative. Bell Boeing took a risk with this decision. A contract stipulation included
NASA's right to publish the results, even if they were negative. [Ref. 18]
The FY- 1990 budget gave drowning PMA-275 a breath of air. In reaction to the
FY- 1990 budget, PMA-275 modified the contract's Statement of Work (SOW) to focus
on RDT&E and only those production items necessary should a production decision be
made at a later date. Additionally, BGEN Blot received approval from the Secretary of
the Navy to return the program's Acquisition Strategy to co-production. The austere
funding did not warrant competition for production, again, should a production decision
ever be made. [Ref. 17:p. 3]
OSD did not quickly relinquish the RDT& E funding authorized by the FY-1990
budget. On 24 November, nine days after the President signed the budget making it law
and a day after Congress had adjourned for the holidays, OSD proposed impounding V-
22 FY- 1990 RDT&E funding. After a high level meeting 28 November 1990 between
SECNAV, SECDEF, USDA, and DEPSECDEF, the FY-1990 RDT&E funds were finally
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released. However, DEPSECDEF then directed PMA-275 to terminate for convenience
(T for C) long lead production preparation. FY- 1989 APN funding obligated by the FY-
1990 budget for this purpose was deobligated and Bell Boeing was served a FSD contract
termination notice. The recouped $200 million was placed on hold by the Department of
Defense Comptroller Sean O'Keefe. [Ref. 17:p. 4]
The repeated efforts by the administration to kill the program went beyond normal
political boundaries. Pennsylvania Congressman Weldon's view of the administration's
maneuver, as expressed in the 5 December issue of Defense Daily, demonstrates how
ugly the fight got; "Secretary Cheney displayed the ultimate in arrogance by trying to
administratively subvert the defense budget process while Congress was in recess." [Ref.
21 :p. 24] Even congressmen who had no clear interest in the program expressed concern
for the administration's apparent lack of regard for the previous year's budget agreement.
California Congressman Dellums stated, "In effect, the Department of Defense is
exercising a line item veto of Congress's intent, and that, as we all know, is against the
law." [Ref. 21:p. 27] The General Accounting office (GAO) later ruled against DoD's
conduct. The FSD contracts were already terminated, however, and what was done could
not be "un-done."
With the first week in February 1990 came the FY- 1991 Presidential Budget. It
assumed a negative conclusion from the IDA study, which had not been released, and
allotted zero funding for the V-22. Congress had made it clear that a FY- 1991 V-22
production decision would be based on the IDA study results. Moreover, the budget took
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$200 million Secretary Cheney recently recouped from the terminated long lead
production preparation, and dispersed it to other DoD programs. [Ref. 19:p. 339]
On 21 February, the Tiltrotor Coalition organized to fight DoD's efforts to kill the
program. On the steps of the Air and Space Museum in Washington, DC, the group
outlined the past efforts ofOSD to kill the program, and highlighted the many advantages
tiltrotor technology offered America. Membership included congressmen and industrial
leaders. Not allowed to be part of such a group, but there in spirit, were senior Marines.
The day prior, Marine Aviator LTGEN Pittman, who had been on the aborted "Desert
One" mission, stated that helicopter technology was too constrained and that tiltwing or
tiltrotor technology "was the way to go." [Ref. 23:p. 3]
The long awaited IDA study provided mixed responses. Though the study was
completed in April, DoD did not immediately release it, and in so doing created some
distrust. Meanwhile, a BDM analysis concluded that though $7 billion more expensive,
the V-22 was tactically superior across the board. The Lawrence Livermore Labs study
came to the same conclusion. When finally released on 29 June, the conclusion of the
IDA study favored the V-22 alternative as well. The study analyzed both the helicopter
and V-22 options in eight mission scenarios—four Marine, two Air Force and two Navy.
Since the main detractor for the V-22 in the controversial PA&E study was cost, IDA
analyzed the V-22 at the $33 million 502 aircraft fleet level and at a helicopter option cost
level of $24 million with 356 aircraft. In both cases the V-22 was determined to be more
effective. In some of the longer range missions, the advantages were drastic. [Ref. 22]
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In hearings before the Senate appropriations Committee on 19 July of 1990, Dr.
Chu and Dr. Simmons cordially debated the IDA study conclusions. Senator Inouye
noted at the hearing, however, that, in his recollection of 20 years in the Senate, this was
"the first time that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has come out with full force to
attack the assumptions, the credibility, the results, and the recommendations of the IDA."
[Ref. 22 :p. 57] Dr. Chu argued that the tactical assumptions were flawed. Marine
doctrine did not allow for more than two sorties or high-speed external lift flight. Dr.
Simmons agreed that assumptions alter results but even with all the assumptions changed
to Dr. Chu's view, the V-22 would still be superior. Dr. Chu's earlier tactical
assumptions about dual slinging external loads were considered "totally ridiculous" by
then Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Gray. Nonetheless, Dr. Chu summed up
his view about the helicopter option by stating, "Maybe they (helicopters) are going to
cost more to operate, especially if you buy a lot more, but that is downstream." Up front
costs of possibly $42 million per V-22 were too much for DoD to fund even if the life
cycle costs were less expensive. [Ref. 22 :p. 78]
An interesting comment during the hearings by Senator Bumpers proved to be an
omen of things to come. In stressing the importance of the decision before the
committee, he expressed that Saddam Hussein's recent criticism of Kuwait's oil sales
may turn into a situation where we as a nation may indeed need the advanced technology
provided by platforms like the V-22. Indeed, the IDA study highlighted the strength of
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the V-22 in a Middle East scenario. Two weeks later Iraq invaded Kuwait. [Ref. 22:p.
66]
The program would continue under the restricted FSD funding throughout the rest
of FY- 1990. It completed DT-IIA with Government test pilots doing the flying. Three
aircraft were now flying and the program prepared for V-22 shipboard evaluation in the
winter.
With the new fiscal year came $246 million for RDT&E and $365 million APN.
The RDT&E funds included the disputed $200 million rolled over from the original FY-
1989 APN funds. Desert Shield was underway as the program underwent shipboard
testing aboard USS WASP with FSD aircraft Three and Four [Ref. 24]. With the austere
funding and budget uncertainty, the Program Manager and ASN(RDA) agreed to delete
the Acquisition Plan's requirement for an engine second source. [Ref. 17:p. 3]
The illusive $200 million from FY- 1989 continued to sit in the OSD
Comptroller's "bank." Secretary Cheney proposed, once again, no new funding for the
V-22 in the FY- 1992 President's Budget. Congress responded by including specific
direction for OSD in a Desert Storm "Dire Emergency" bill, passed 22 March and in its
"plus up" of FY- 1992 funding to $790 million. The Office of the Secretary of defense
was to obligate the still withheld $200 million FY- 1989 APN funds within 60 days of the
supplemental. The FY- 1992 funding was earmarked for development, manufacture and
operational testing of three production representative V-22 aircraft to meet all of the
previous JSOR requirements by 31 December 1996. The OSD released the $200 million
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in April 1992, and on 10 June 1992 the RDT&E funds were finally obligated. The $790
million would be debated later.
The program could not enjoy the victory over the RDT&E funding for more than
one day. On 1 1 June, FSD Aircraft Five crashed on its initial hover check in Wilmington,
Delaware. The crew experienced insurmountable lateral control problems. The aircraft
rolled left and the left proprotor and nacelle impacted the flight line. There were no
fatalities. [Ref. 25 :p. 462]
The mishap investigation carried out by Bell and the Navy concluded that there
were no design failures in the V-22. Production personnel had incorrectly installed
wiring. Mishaps, as accidents are called in the Navy and Marine Corps, always have a
chain of causal events that lead up to the actual event. Aircraft Five had been stopped
and started over the past three years numerous times due to the funding instability. With
each stoppage cycle, production personnel turned over duties. One of these turnovers
occurred during flight control wire installation. Though efforts were made to ensure
proper turnover, the wiring of roll rate sensors for the primary flight controls was done
incorrectly. Pilot roll rate input was miscalculated by the flight control sensors and
Aircraft Five rolled left and impacted the flight line. [Ref. 26 :p. 33]
The program recovered from the crash well. The week following the mishap, the
stop work order on the sixth FSD aircraft was cancelled to make up for the loss of
Aircraft Five. Aircraft Six was about 50 percent complete when budgetary concerns
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forced its sabbatical. Test flights resumed after three months of down time used to
inspect all aircraft critical items. [Ref. 17:p. 6]
The FY- 1992 budget's direction for the use of the $790 million caused some
"enabling problems" for the program. The six-year FSD contract was complete and
Congress wanted to see the results of the effort. Later Congress required a "FSD II"
Acquisition Plan be delivered within 60 days that would map out how three newly funded
production representative aircraft would be ready for OPEVAL on 31 December 1996.
The "problem" was that the program was not mature enough to meet this timeline. This
was "enabling" because it caused an eventual showdown to occur where Congress and
OSD would work out a compromise—one which sounded a lot like later acquisition
reform initiatives.
The V-22's inability to meet the JSOR requirements provided OSD an
opportunity, once again, to impound appropriated V-22 funding. On 3 June, the GAO,
once again, ruled that the OSD was guilty of rescission and that it had until 3 August to
obligate the earmarked V-22 funds. OSD countered that it was illegal to obligate funds
knowing full well that the purpose for the obligation could not be fulfilled.
On 20 July, disaster struck. Aircraft Four crashed into the Potomac River as it
was on final approach to the Quantico airfield. Seven crewmen were killed. Bell and
Navy investigators determined that the causal factor was pooled transmission fluid in the
left engine nacelle. The fluid ignited as it leaked onto the engine during the nacelles'
rotation from the horizontal to vertical positions. Power continued to the drive system
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from the operating second engine until the heat from the engine fire burned through the
connecting shaft. This caused the aircraft to roll, uncontrollably, into the river. As a
result, Congress required mishap investigation reports be completed prior to FY- 1993
budget authorization and appropriation. [Ref. 3 1 :p. 299]
Two weeks later, and two days after the GAO deadline, Acting Secretary of the
Navy Sean O'Keefe, was called before the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems
sub-committee and the Research and Development subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee to defend his department's actions. In the following exchange, it is
evident that the time and cost goals set by Congress for the three new aircraft were not
achievable:
CHAIRMAN. It is the provisions then in the appropriations bill that are
"engineeringly" unworkable, in particular the 1996 date; is that what you
are saying? Is that the part that is unworkable?
MR. OKEEFE. The Project Manager and the engineers involved in the
program suggest that the combination of three different events in the
statute is what is the show-stopper. The first is the requirement for a
production representative aircraft which they determine to require on the
order of about a 44 month production timeframe. Second, there is a
further requirement that it be tested by a certain date which can not be
accomplished in that window. The third feature is that $790 million will
not get you that program. [Ref. 27 :p. 6]
Congress, understandably, held any DoD representative suspect. It was the
impression of those at the hearing that DoD was, again, trying to kill the program. Funds
were not being obligated and Secretary O'Keefe justified his actions with a legal
loophole.
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After outlining the program problems. Secretary O'Keefe proposed an alternative
"FSD II" [Ref. 27:p. 1 1]. Though Congress was understandably skeptical of Secretary
O'Keefe's motives, the program, as it stood, could not meet JSOR requirements.
Secretary O'Keefe's MLR "FSD II" phase included a radical new Request For Proposal
(RFP). When asked by Congressman Dellums how this RFP would lower the program's
cost, Secretary O'Keefe responded:
In essence, this request for proposal is going to be one of the most
painfully short ones ever released. It is going to say to the contractor,
propose how many prototypes you think are necessary and at whatever
amount you think is appropriate, knowing we have $790 million in the
bank now and an undetermined amount that Congress will decide... [Ref.
27:p. 10]
Two weeks after the congressional hearing, one of two Bell XV- 15 tiltrotors
crashed. Just four days after the mishap, the National Transportation Safety Board
announced that the crash was due to a loose connecting rod bolt in the aircraft's left
nacelle. Without control of the connecting rods, control of proprotor angles was lost,
causing the aircraft to crash. Since the XV- 15 mishap was not due to tiltrotor design
error, the program was virtually unaffected. [Ref. 30:p. 26]
D. HISTORY'S GREATEST MULLIGAN
Though Secretary O'Keefe was not thought of as a "pal of the program," what
may have been meant to terminate the program, eventually benefited it [Ref. 32]. As
Frank Gaffney, Director of the Center For Security Policy, put it, "(Secretary Cheney)
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ordered the Marines to change the requirement in such a way as to permit it to be satisfied
by an existing or future helicopter design." [Ref. 33 :p. 31] Because it lowered the cruise
speed requirement from 250 to 180, lowered the self-deployment range from 2,100 miles
to an unspecified amount, and increased the lift requirement from 8,300 pounds to 10,000
pounds, helicopters could possibly have gained an advantage. However, with the new
MLR draft ORD, came a new cost reimbursable contract and favorable new conditions
that opened up possibilities for innovative solutions. [Ref. 27:p. 9]
On 22 October, two weeks prior to national elections, the Navy terminated the V-
22 FSD contract for the convenience of the Government (T for C). It then awarded a
$550 million undefinitized letter contract to Bell Boeing for Engineering, Manufacturing
and Development (EMD) of four new V-22 derivative aircraft to meet the new MLR
ORD requirements (later definitized to $2.65 billion CPAF). Vice President Quail
delivered the news to Boeing in Philadelphia in person [Ref. 7]. The Navy awarded
$19.6 million for eight advanced helicopter concept studies and another COEA. [Ref.
28:p. 3] This second chance for Bell Boeing was termed "history's greatest mulligan" by
Ross Clark of Boeing Helicopter because it not only gave them another shot at the V-22,
but gave Bell Boeing the leeway to decide just how their new mission should be met.
[Ref. 29]
New manufacturing techniques, information systems and management tools were
now available that were not available back in 1986, when the terminated FSD contract
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was written. This new contract opened up the door to what is now called "acquisition
reform," but back in 1992, was just smart business.
Boeing had just designed the B-777 for United Airlines using many of these new
advanced capabilities. The new cost plus award fee contract enabled Bell Boeing to take
the risk of incorporating new management and manufacturing technologies so vital to the
"triple 7's" success and cut costs by 12 percent. Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) were
used in development and production of the B-777. Computer aided design and
manufacturing enabled Boeing to reduce notorious problems like "tolerance stack-up"
and thus build quality into the aircraft instead of inspecting it in at the end of the
production line. Manpower-extensive composite application was replaced by castings
and tape-laying machines [Ref. 35:p. 9]. The development of the "triple 7" was so
exacting that the first aircraft built was also the first aircraft to fly passengers for United.
[Ref. 34:p. 4]
The planning for execution of the "New V-22" program jumped into gear with the
new year. Secretary Deutche replaced Secretary Cheney as the Clinton administration
came into the White House. The Program Executive Officer, PEO(A), reviewed the
program 14 January 1993 and again 23 June 1993. Potential for high risk was found if
the program was not able to solve contractor personnel and systems management
problems, so PMA-275 set out to mitigate these risks in preparation for an upcoming
DAB.
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On 5 August 1993, the Defense Acquisition Board's Acquisition Decision
Memorandum (ADM) issued the following five directives:
1
.
Formal DAB November 1 993
2. Combine Marine and Air Force COEA
3. Prepare FYDP profiles of $4, $5,& $6 Billion, with less than $ 1 Billion
pre-production year
4. Rebaseline the program
5. JROC review ORDs and provide recommendations [Ref. 17:p. 8]
These five directives were achieved, but not necessarily according to timeline.
The formal DAB was postponed until 13 September 1994 to realign the V-22 program
with new Marine maneuver warfare requirements. The combined COEA, once again,
concluded that the new V-22 was more effective than the helicopter options. In
December of 1994, Secretary Deutche approved the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP)
in Program Decision Memorandum IV. The program was re-baselined by 13 September
of 1994. Both Marine and Air Force ORDs were validated by the JROC by December of
1994. [Ref. 17:p.p. 8,9]
The Department of Defense conducted a bottom-up review in September 1 993
that further encouraged joint program acquisition. The Air Force requirement during the
budget battles with Cheney had been secondary since 85 percent of the planned
procurement was required by the Marine Corps. When the MLR program was devised,
the Air Force was forced to draft an AFSOC specific "MVX" ORD. Two programs
existed under two separate ORDs at PMA-275 and the program had to integrate their
efforts. The ORD was validated by the JROC in December of 1993, but the Air Force
was directed to join in with the ongoing Marine efforts and combine ORDs. [Ref. 36]
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The Marine MLR ORD, thus transformed back to "pre-Cheney" requirements, and now
included key performance parameters of 240(Threshold)-270(Objective) knots and self-
deployability worldwide. The program was once again multi-service. [Ref. 33 :p. 31]
In October of 1993, the DoD considered the V-22 as a possible acquisition reform
"pilot program." Many of the initiatives already in place were noted, but as Robert
Holzer of Defense News reported at the time "because of its uncertain status, it may be
less attractive than other candidates." Mr. Holzer was correct. It was not selected. [Ref.
34:p. 4]
The 1 3 September 1 993 Milestone II plus (MS 11+) DAB results were released in
the Acquisition Decision Memorandum of 10 February 1994. In this document,
numerous key items were decided:
1
.
Navy was established as the lead service
2. Navy fund all RDT&E for CV-22
3. MV-22 (Marine) IOC, FY-01
4. CV-22 (Special Operations) IOC, FY-05
5. USAF funds MV common equipment for CV-22
6. CINCSOCOM funds mission unique equipment for CV-22
7. DSB recommendations to DAB
8. USN & CINCSOCOM propose CV-22 exit criteria
9. LRIP I long lead funds approved
10. DAB review prior to LRIP
11. ASR, APBA and TEMP complete by 1 May 1995 [Ref. 17:p. 9]
Two months later, the MVX and MLR ORDs were combined into the Joint Multi-
mission Vertical Lift Aircraft JMVX ORD. This was approved by the JROC 04 April
1995.
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In February of 1996, the program successfully past its LRIP DAB review.
Authorization to produce four production representative aircraft for follow on testing was
given. The first aircraft was due to Patuxent River Naval Air Station in early 1 997.
Due to the $1 billion cap per year for procurement set by the 1993 DAB ADM,
aircraft production lot inefficiencies existed. However, the most recent Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) successfully increased production rates to gain more efficient lot
production. With the new production buy the cost per aircraft is at roughly $32 million.
The current plan will stretch out until 2014. Its production rate is 30 MV-22 per year
(starting 2004) and 360 aircraft total for the Marine Corps, 50 for the Air Force and 48 for
the Navy.
In March of 1 997, the first of four EMD test aircraft was delivered to Patuxent
River Naval Air Station. Though a bit behind schedule, all four were delivered by
January of 1998. Operational pilots are currently receiving flight instruction in aircraft
that they will later evaluate during Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL). Milestone III is
set for December 2000.
Funding profiles for the program are now solid. In 1997, the program had
$1,322.4 million. FY-1998 budget authorizations "plussed up" the program's original
LRIP purchase from five to seven and appropriated $1,206.1 million [Ref. 37:p. 1].




In this chapter, the researcher has provided a brief chronology of events in the
program's rocky history. The four basic sections of this chapter have been 1) the tiltrotor
technology development from the British and German designs prior to WWII to present,
2) the birth of the program at Milestone I, 3) the fight for the Program to stay alive, and
4) history's greatest mulligan, the "New V-22" program.
F. CONCLUSION
Next, Chapter III addresses acquisition reform. The background and evolution of
acquisition reform initiatives over the years will be covered first. Next, the prominent
themes of reform in today's acquisition arena are covered. Finally, the status of how
current pilot programs are fairing under current initiatives are presented as a benchmark




"Nothing is more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful ofsuccess,





Weapons procurement inefficiency has haunted America for some time. So, too,
have efforts to correct the process. The recent efforts toward "a new order" in acquisition
seek to make the Department of Defense "the smartest, most responsive buyer of the best
goods and services, that meet our warfighters' needs, at the best dollar value over the life
of the product." [Ref. 39:p. 1] This noble goal has been shared by numerous other
previous acquisition reform efforts. This chapter briefly traces the evolution of
acquisition reform. It also describes the current proposed solution as reflected in DoD's
"Guiding Principles" of acquisition reform. The chapter ends with a brief look at efforts
to measure whether or not the "new order" in acquisition is producing favorable results.
B. ACQUISITION REFORM HISTORY
Many efforts at improving the manner in which America arms itself have taken
place over the years—and for good reason. Recognized problems in procurement go as
far back as our founding fathers. A 1992 GAO report recognized cost growth and
schedule delays occurring as far back as 1 794 in the procurement of six frigates that were
to form the backbone of the Navy. After schedule delays and cost overruns, only three
were actually delivered. Since then, the Government has grappled with efforts to acquire
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major weapon systems effectively. This subchapter will briefly describe a handful of the
many efforts. [Ref. 40:p. 18]
1. Plowshares To Swords
The first period of procurement is one in which no military industrial complex
existed. Industry would change production from "plowshares to swords" with each
national emergency, in response to the change in demand. Reform took place during each
ramp-up in weapons procurement.
a) The Civil War
The Civil War provided the first real catalyst to form procurement policy.
As necessity is the mother of invention, crisis is the mother of solution. Prior to the war,
procurement procedures were simple. After Congress appropriated funds, the military's
purchasing agents would seek a local vendor's business. Due to the great demand
brought on by the war, these local vendors increased their prices dramatically. With
recent communication technology developments like the telegraph, the Government was
able to respond by actively soliciting other vendors from throughout the Union. This new
policy of advertising, or solicitation, delivered lower prices for the Union's war effort.
[Ref.41:p. 80]
After the Civil War, solicitation for the lowest bid became the focus of
acquisition at the expense of schedule and performance. By 1884, procurement statutes
stated that "the award in every case shall be made to the lowest responsible bidder for the
best and most suitable article" [Ref. 41 :p. 80]. The lowest bid was easily quantifiable but
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the "responsible" and "most suitable" were subjective factors left to opinion. Opinion
justification as to vendor "responsibility" and ""suitability" took place by exception only
and required Attorney General approval. Incentive, therefore, existed to award to the
lowest bidder at the expense of schedule and performance. [Ref. 41:p. 180]
In 1893, the Dockery Commission was established to review federal
administrative activities. Congressman Alexander M. Dockery and his team reported
"widespread duplication of contracting functions and a failure to use standardized
specifications." It recommended a multiagency board be created to review all purchases.
[Ref. 53 :p. 65]
b) World War I
World War I provided a major opportunity for reform to take place. With
the mobilization effort came the requirement for higher quality items at an expedited rate.
The established procurement system of lengthy solicitations was incapable of meeting
this requirement. In response, negotiation without solicitation was allowed to take place.
The expedited process helped. Still not enough vendors responded, however, due to the
risk in developing new products for a fixed price. As a solution, a "cost-plus percentage"
contract replaced previous "fixed price" solicitations. Unfortunately, the cost plus
percentage incentivized some unethical contractors to incur great "costs" and thus
increase their "percentage." The Government responded by creating a Federal War
Industries Board in July of 1917 and by developing a new "cost plus fixed fee" contract.
Chairman Bernard Baruch and the new War Industries Board limited new fixed fees to
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"fair and just market prices" and allowed great degree of leeway for the two executive
military departments. [Ref. 44:p. 98]
c) World War II
World War II provided the next opportunity for acquisition reform. The
National Defense Authorization Act of 1940, Executive Order 9001, the Letter Contract,
National Procurement Manual and renegotiation were all efforts to optimize cost,
schedule and performance in preparation for the upcoming war. The 1940 National
Defense Expediting Act set ground rules for America's transition from plowshares to
planes. It authorized awarding "cost plus fixed fee" to other than the lowest bidder.
Also, it authorized providing advance payments up to 30 percent of the contract price and
splitting contract awards between multiple vendors in order to incentivize and broaden
the industrial capacity. President Roosevelt's new Executive Order 9001 authorized
quarterly review of contract revisions that, until this point, required resolicitation and a
great deal of time. Assistant Secretary of War Patterson devised a Letter of Intent, later
known as the Letter Contract, that incentivized contractors to start on contracts prior to
understanding fully the "fine print" involved. Work continued while details were hashed
out. He also centralized a national procurement manual, similar to today's FAR, which
streamlined and consolidated contract preparation and conformance. Because of the "cost
plus" abuses, renegotiation of contracts was finally allowed to reestablish fair and
reasonable prices.
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During the war, the success of systems acquisition relied on a close
relationship between industry and the military. Working together, this "arsenal of
democracy" produced staggering statistics. In 1 94 1 , America increased its production of
airplanes by more than 500 percent from 3,600 to 18,000 a year. By 1944, American
industry increased its production rate to over 1 00,000 planes of the quality similar to F-
4U Corsairs and P-51 Mustangs. [Ref. 45 :p. 81]
2. The New Military Industrial Complex
With the onset of the Korean War, America became the guardian of democracy
throughout the world. The post-war shift back to an isolated peace economy, as had
occurred up until now in the nation's history, could not happen. A new Cold War
required that our weapons stay a step ahead of the communist war machine. This newly
required military industrial complex set out, "cost plus" contracts in hand, to be, once
again, the "arsenal for democracy." [Ref. 45 :p. 82]
Growing accomplishments in military technology rivaled the production
accomplishments of World War II. The growing Soviet threat in 1945 required that a
new strategic bomber fly "almost three times as far, . . .25 percent higher, . . .and deliver
four times the payload" of a B-29. Within two years, the B-36 was produced. As the
B-36 was delivered, the growing speed requirement drove the design for a jet bomber.
By 1951, the first of 2,000 B-47s was delivered. The B-47 could cruise 250 percent
faster than the B-36. One year later, the first of over 800 B-52s was delivered. A B-52
could fly 10,000 feet higher and carry four times the payload of a B-47. [Ref. 45 :p. 82]
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This military industrial might in 1947 seamed unstoppable and with it, the power
and influence of the military industrial complex. National leaders questioned the
influential role of this new powerbroker and initiated simultaneous efforts to support, yet
also limit, the power of the military industrial complex. With the National Security Act
of 1947's creation of the new civilian led National Military Establishment came questions
as to its role in and management of the military industrial complex. President
Eisenhower warned in his farewell speech that "the councils of Government . . .must
guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by
the military industrial complex." [Ref. 45 :p. 83]
a) Hoover Commission
In 1 947, the Hoover Commission was tasked with reviewing the executive
branch of Government and making recommendations as to how it might be better
managed and organized. The commission's Eberstadt task force on the National Security
Organization concluded that the new organization "neither worked well nor yielded
maximum security for the defense dollar." Additionally, it noted that intense inter-
service rivalry "hampered and confused" policy. The task force recommended greater
authority be granted to the Secretary of Defense, that the military budget system be
overhauled and that teamwork within the organization be improved. [Ref. 45 :p. 59]
b) "375 Series"
Lessons were learned during the Korean War on how to manage the
intricate pyramid of Government, contractor, subcontractor and supplier relationships
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from concept formulation to eventual phase out. These lessons learned were applied to
the design, development, manufacture, test and evaluation and support of a new missile
program in the "375 series" of procurement regulations, published in the late 1950s by
the Air Force Systems Command. Figure 3.1 illustrates the acquisition life cycle devised
by the air Force Systems command "375 series" regulations.






























Figure 3.1, "375 Series" Acquisition Life Cycle [Ref. 45:p. 358]
c) FYDP and PPBS
The defense acquisition system underwent some major changes
with the appointment of Robert S. McNamara to the position of Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) on 21 January 1961. A former business executive, the SECDEF set out to run
DoD as he would a major company. Two reforms that affected the defense acquisition
system were the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) and the Planning, Programming and
Budget System (PPBS).
The FYDP grouped all defense resources according to the principal
missions—regardless of service affiliation. The principal missions were further broken
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down to elements. Inputs of manpower, defense systems and installations were converted




2. General Purpose Forces
3. Intelligence and Communications
4. Airlift and Sealift
5. Ground and Reserve Forces
6. Research and Development
7. Central Supply and Maintenance
8. Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities
9. Administrative and Associated Activities
10. Support of Other Nations [Ref. 45 :p. 349]
To make this system work, the SECDEF used another tool he had
used in commercial business—the Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS).
The national strategy (plan) was developed into an appropriate force structure (program)
and then funded accordingly (budget). As national strategy changes with changing world
events, PPBS is updated throughout the process accordingly. This PPBS system, with
some adjustments, is the system still in use today. Figure 3.2 illustrates the ongoing
nature of the process.
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Figure 3.2, McNamara PPBS Process [Ref. 45 :p. 350]
d) DoD Acquisition Improvement Program
By 1981, the acquisition process had become overburdened by
oversight and regulation. In response, Deputy secretary of defense Frank C. Carlucci
directed that 32 initiatives be taken to reduce over regulation and increase efficiency. The
"DoD Acquisition Improvement Program" emphasized conducting long range planning,
shortening the acquisition cycle, budgeting realistically, enhancing program stability and
reducing cost. Authority shifted back to the program Manager to tailor his program
innovatively within directives. [Ref. 45 :p. 233]
e) The Packard Commission
On 15 July 1985, President Reagan established a Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management in response to unsettling stories about overpriced
spare parts, test deficiencies and cost and schedule overruns. The President and Congress
faced record budget deficits and apparent inefficiencies warranted investigation. A major
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task of the commission was to "evaluate the defense acquisition system, to determine
how it might be improved, and to recommend changes . . ." This mission was given to an
Acquisition Task Force (ATF) directed by William J. Perry. [Ref. 5 1 :p. 41]
The ATF concluded that further diagnosis of the "sick patient" would only
result in "Band-Aid treatment of an inner illness"—much the way other reform
initiatives had. Instead, the ATF investigated comparable Government and commercial
systems in order to find successful exemplars on which to base reforms. This "search for
excellence" led the ATF to American and Japanese companies employing Total Quality
Management (TQM). [Ref. 51:p. 41]
The ATF identified six features that these successful companies had in
common that could be applied to defense acquisition management. Clear command
channels, stability, limited reporting requirements, communications with users,
prototyping/testing and small, high-quality staffs typified most successful commercial
programs. [Ref. 51:p. 50]
The ATF then derived a formula for action of nine steps by which defense
acquisition could come to emulate the successful companies. The ATF believed that if
these nine steps were followed, it would be possible to cut in half the ten to fifteen-year
acquisition cycle. The ATF encouraged both the legislative and executive branches to set
the example of teamwork that would be required to implement these steps.
(1) Streamline Acquisition Organization and Procedures. In
order to clear up lines of responsibility and authority, the ATF recommended five actions.
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First, create a level II appointment position in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
responsible for the defense acquisition system with the title Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition). Second, establish comparable senior top-level civilian appointee positions
in the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force to serve as Service Acquisition
Executives. Third, each Service Acquisition Executive should appoint program
Executive Officers. Fourth, recodify the Federal procurement laws into a single, greatly
simplified statute applicable Government-wide. Fifth, reduce the number of acquisition
personnel substantially. [Ref. 5 1 :p. 54]
(2) Use Technology to Reduce Cost. During the Cold War,
technology was used to increase performance. The ATF recommended the use of
technology to reduce cost. The use of technology to reduce cost had reduced the cost of
computer products tenfold. The role of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) should be expanded to prototype systems in order to determine cost and
mission effectiveness during early development. [Ref. 51 :p. 55]
(3) Balance Cost and Performance. The ATF found that DoD
ignored many opportunities to adapt existing systems. Costly new systems were built to
user requirement specifications that were not effectively challenged by the Defense
Systems Acquisition Review Council. The developmental versus non-developmental
decision should be made early on by a restructured Joint Requirements Management
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Board co-chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) and the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Ref. 51:p. 57]
(4) Stabilize Programs. The ATF recommended two ways to
enhance program stability. First, "baselining" of major weapon systems should be
initiated. A "baseline" agreement of support should be honored both up and down the
chain. Second, the use of multi-year procurement for high-priority systems approved for
Full Scale development should take place. The use of multi-year funding would include
Congress into the baseline agreement. [Ref. 51:p. 59]
(5) Expand the Use of Commercial Products. Military
specifications and over development of custom-made items failed to capitalize on the
power of the free market system. The ATF recommended that DoD streamline military
specifications and adopt commercial specifications and standards where possible.
Additionally, DoD should take greater advantage of commercial "off-the-shelf items.
Once thought to be of inferior reliability, commercial items were now comparable or
superior to DoD developed systems in some instances. Economies of scale and market
forces would ensure cost control and relieve DoD of the administrative burden of cost
verification. [Ref. 5 1 :p. 60]
(6) Increase the Use of Competition. The ATF found that
commercial procurement competition simultaneously pursued three objectives: attracting
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the best qualified supplier, validating product quality and performance and obtaining the
best price. Defense acquisition sought the lowest price but neglected the other two
objectives. To fully capitalize on competition DoD should:
• Accept statistical process control techniques
• Solicit using functional, vice detail, design characteristics
• Maintain/use a quality supplier past performance list
• Treat price as one of several important factors
• Refocus the Competition in Contracting Act on quality of competition vice
quantity of competition. [Ref. 51:p. 63]
(7) Clarify the Need For Technical Data Rights. The ATF
found that defense acquisition rights-in-data regulations reduced incentives for American
industry to do business with DoD. DoD should alter this policy as follows:
• If a product has been developed in private, DoD should not demand unlimited
rights but directed licensing, if required.
• If a product has been developed by both Government and private funding,
rights should be defined during negotiations according to the degree of private
investment.
• If a product has been developed entirely with Government funds, the
Government should consider permitting the rights to reside with the contractor
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if not otherwise required for competition, publication and dissemination. [Ref.
50:p. 64]
(8) Enhance the Quality of Acquisition Personnel. The ATF
found that the defense acquisition workforce was under-trained, underpaid and
inexperienced. Action should be taken to attract more qualified personnel and to train
and motivate current personnel. Specifically, recruitment and retention of personnel
should correlate with pay, advancement and incentives based on performance similar to a
program conducted at the Navy's China Lake Test Center.
[Ref. 51 :p. 68]
(9) Improve the Capability for Industrial Mobilization. The
ATF found that that there was no effective policy on industrial mobilization. Preparation
time given in past wars and competition for Federal funding provided incentive for ad-
hoc planning at best. The ATF found arsenals, shipyards, stockpiling and manufacturing
equipment in immediate need of modernization. The President, with assistance from the
National Security Council and DoD should establish a comprehensive and effective
national industrial responsiveness policy capable of supporting the full spectrum of
potential emergencies. Procurement practices in DoD should provide incentive for
industry to modernize production processes. [Ref. 51:p. 71]
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f) Defense Management Review (DMRj
The Packard Commission's report set down many of the reforms required
in DoD. In June of 1989, Secretary of Defense Cheney set out to implement the
recommendations of the Packard Commission with a Defense Management Review
(DMR). Rather than plow the same ground as previous studies, it would build on their
principles and outline a "pragmatic, workable set of recommended changes" to the
acquisition laws. "Executive-legislative branch partnership was implicitly recognized by
the Senate in approving the legislation that authorized the formation of the Acquisition
Laws, otherwise known as the Section 800 Panel." [Ref. 52:p. 33]
In January 1993, as the Commanders in Chief conducted their change of
command, the panel submitted a 1 ,800 page report to Congress, culminating 1 6 months
of effort. More than 600 acquisition statutes were reviewed and categorized as to whether
they should be retained, repealed, amended or sustained. [Ref. 52:p. 33] Major
recommendations included:
• Place Much stronger language in statutes toward procuring commercial/non-
developmental items.
• Increase the small purchase threshold to $100,000, as opposed to the current
$25,000
• Develop commercial terms and conditions
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• Establish greater controls over the Department of energy/Environmental
Protection Agency contracts, which have been lax and could be ripe for
problems
• Delete warranty provisions for major weapon systems guarantees
• Repeal the Byrd Amendment (regarding lobbying disclosure)
• Implement a major overhaul of the laws pertaining to small business and small
disadvantaged business
• Outline a new alternative approach for dealing with technical data [Ref. 52:p.
33]
• Reduce number of protest forums
• Disclose more information to unsuccessful bidders in debriefings
• Exempt contracts below $ 1 00,000 from most socioeconomic requirements
[Ref. 53 :p. 66]
g) Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA)
In response to recommendations by the Packard Commission, the
House Committee on Armed Services conducted an in depth assessment of the
acquisition work force. On 8 May 1 990, the committee produced a 776-page document,
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Are the services appointing program managers, deputy program
managers and contracting officers with the experience, education
and training required by law and regulation, and are program
managers being retained in their positions the mandatory four-
years or completion of a major milestone?
2. Is there a career program structure to develop qualified and
professional acquisition personnel—both military and civilian?
3. Is there an appropriate mix of military and civilian personnel
within the workforce?
4. What impediments exist that must be overcome in order to
develop a quality, professional, workforce? [Ref. 54:p. 2]
The committee's conclusions were grim. Only 11 percent of the 94
reviewed Program Manager turnovers complied with Public Law 98-525. The average
tenure of a Program Manager was 24.6 months—not 48. No effective structure was in
place to develop the acquisition workforce. Whereas approximately 98 percent of the
military members of the workforce held college degrees or higher, less than half of their
civilian counterparts held equivalent education. Acquisition experience was not
structured. Civilians remained in positions for too long and were not exposed to the full
spectrum required to assume positions of leadership. Military officers did not remain in a
position long enough before being transferred to the next position. Breadth of experience
was provided at the expense of depth of experience. Acquisition education at the Defense
Systems Management College, Air Force Institute of technology and the Naval
Postgraduate School was predominantly provided to military officers who would later
manage programs, but not to their supporting staffs.
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In November 1 990, Congress passed the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act (DAWIA) to improve the effectiveness of the military and civilian
acquisition workforce through formalized training and career development. The
corresponding DoD order, DoD 5000.52, established:
• Education, training and experience standards for each acquisition position
• The Director of Acquisition Career Management (DACM) for each service
andOSD
• An Acquisition Corps of (0-4) or GS/GM-1 3 and above
h) National Performance Review (NPR)
Created on March 3, 1993, the National Performance Review was tasked
to make Government "work better and cost less." Vice President Gore submitted the
original report From Red Tape To Results: Creating a Government that works Better and
Costs Less on 7 September, 1993. This original report made 384 recommendations,
including acquisition reform and other measures, for anticipated savings of $108 billion.
[Ref.48:p. 1]
3. From Defense Industrial Base to U.S. Industrial Base
The DoD responded to the NPR with impressive measures. It reduced its
workforce by 12 percent, 110,000, by the end of 1995, with anticipated total personnel
reductions of 23 percent, 210,000, by FY- 1999. Additionally, DoD anticipates $12.3
billion in savings from NPR related acquisition legislation, the 1 994 Federal Acquisition
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Streamlining Act and the 1996 Federal Acquisition Reform Act. These acts, covered in
the next section, have successfully shifted procurement from the post cold war defense
industrial base to the commercial U.S. industrial base. [Ref. 49]
a) The 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA)
The 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) impacted all areas
of the procurement process. The changes due to the FASA occurred in five general areas.
Authorization was granted to conduct Pilot Programs. Commercial items and practices
were emphasized. Simple Acquisition Threshold (SAT) and Simplified Acquisition
Procedures (SAP) were established. A Federal Acquisition Computer Network
(FACNET) was created. Last of all, requirements for Cost and Pricing Data were
reduced. [Ref. 42]
Authorization to conduct pilot programs was granted in order to gain
measurable insight into possible returns from acquisition reform efforts. Certain
reporting waivers were granted and the programs were tied directly to the acquisition
reform Benchmarking Group that are discussed in a later subchapter. [Ref. 42]
Commercial Items and Practices. As with Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR) parts 10, 11 and 12, FASA emphasized the role of market research,
created a preference for purchasing a commercial item, eliminated statutory restrictions
on commercial item purchase and provided for use of commercial practices where
commercial items were not purchased. [Ref. 42]
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The Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) and Simplified Acquisition
Procedures (SAP) were created. The SAT was set at $100,000. All procurements less
than the threshold (99 percent of all DoD contracts) were relieved from numerous
statutory requirements. Simplified procedures (SAP) were set up to accommodate the
inclusion of FACNET and electronic commerce/ electronic data interchange (EC/EDI).
FAR part 13 was altered accordingly. [Ref. 42]
The Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET) was created. This
provided the opportunity to "push" Requests For Proposals (RFPs) to the vendor instead
of making the vendor "pull" them from sources similar to the Commerce Business Daily
(CBD). It also provided for reduction in administrative costs and delays associated with
excess paperwork. FAR parts 4 and 13 were also altered accordingly. [Ref. 42]
The last general area of improvement under FASA was in reducing
requirements for Cost or Pricing data. This piggy-backed off of the effort to use
commercial practices. FASA set a lower threshold of $500,000 for this requirement and
also provided for waivers and exceptions above this threshold. FAR subpart 15.8 was
altered to accommodate this change to cost and pricing data. [Ref. 42]
b) The 1996 Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA)
The 1996 Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) continued the
streamlining efforts in legislative areas. FARA streamlined competition requirements. It
reformed Information Technology (IT) acquisition by repealing former legislation (1965
Brooks Act) that had differentiated and prolonged IT procurement. In following, it
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delegated IT management to a Chief Information Officer (CIO) in each of the Federal
agencies and required the Office of Management and Budget to provide capital
investment guidance. Additionally, FARA allowed contracting officers to limit the
number of bidders considered in the competitive range and increased the "other than full
and open competition" threshold from $10 million to $50 million. It also simplified and
clarified confusing procurement integrity laws and further broadened FASA simplified
acquisition thresholds to include all commercial items up to $5 million. FARA was the
second of a "one-two punch" that showed that congress was "on board" with acquisition
reform. [Ref. 43]
c) Single Process Initiative
On 8 December 1995, Secretary Of Defense Perry announced a "Single
Process Initiative." Multiple procedures were being used to produce like items for
different customers within DoD. With each additional production process, specification,
or standard, the cost of production increased. DoD would pursue a sweeping change to
all current and future defense contracts to consolidate or eliminate multiple processes,
specifications and standards in contractor facilities. This change would occur on a
facility-wide basis. [Ref. 56]
d) DoD 5000 Series Update
Secretary of Defense Perry cemented the new wave of acquisition reform
efforts by revamping the department's regulations on acquisitions—the DoD 5000 series.
Published in March of 1996, the new update included six new themes that are now
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considered the six themes of acquisition reform. The first theme of teamwork optimizes
overall performance. This is done by creating cross-functional integrated product teams
(IPT) that surface problems "up-front and early" in the development process. The second
theme of tailoring enables the Milestone Decision Authority to apply common sense and
sound business practices in accomplishing tasks in an expedient and effective manner.
No two programs are identical, and tailoring allows for the flexibility required. The third
theme of empowerment balances responsibility with authority. The rescintion of volumes
of guidance, documentation and regulation effectively shifts the focus back on the user
representative, the Program Manager, who is empowered to take actions in an upfront and
expeditious fashion. The ability to affect the life cycle cost of a program is exponentially
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Figure 3.3, Life Cycle Cost Impact vs. Time [Ref. 45:p. 351]
The fourth theme of cost as an independent variable (CAIV) forces tough trade-offs
between cost, schedule and performance in an effort to achieve the best value. Greater
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use of commercial products, the fifth theme, recognizes the parity and often superiority of
commercial items when compared to Government developed alternatives. The eighteen-
month life-span for many technologies force "open system" commercial item
procurement in order to keep a system from being obsolete the day it is fielded. The sixth
theme of best practices encourages the use of the most effective tools to get the job done.
[Ref. 47:p. 2]
The update to the DoD Directives 5000 series accomplished four
important objectives. It incorporated FASA provisions and integration of IPTs.
Secondly, it differentiated between mandatory and discretionary procedures. This
increased flexibility and provided incentive to initiate new and creative procurement
methods. The third accomplishment was that the update became more "user friendly."
The guidance was shortened and made available "on-line." The fourth accomplishment
was that it integrated procurement policies for weapon systems and automated
information systems. The four objectives were accomplished using a relationship of the
six themes of acquisition reform and enabling reform initiatives as illustrated in Figure
3.4. [Ref.47:p.2]
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Figure 3.4, Reform Themes and Enabling Initiatives [Ref. 58]
4. History Summary
In this subchapter, the researcher has described the progression of the American
weapons procurement process from one that converted "plowshares into swords" in time
of need, to one that has spawned a sizable defense industrial base. Impressive weapons
system performance resulted but, so too, did program cost, inefficiency and concern over
national defense business ethics. This brought with it increased oversight and regulation
which, in turn, resulted in greater and greater overhead costs. Overzealous focus on this
oversight neglected the quintessential task of effective program management.
"Government saved pennies while billions quietly marched out the door," according to
Dr. Jacques Gansler. Recent acquisition reform efforts seek to reduce the debilitating
amount of regulation and return to "free market" commercial practices. This shift will
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create what Mr. Norman R. Augustine, of Lockheed Martin, has termed a vibrant
"industrial base for defense" from what used to be a "defense industrial base." The next
subchapter looks more in detail at acquisition reform catalysts. [Ref. 55 :p. 46]
C. ACQUISITION REFORM GUIDING PRINCIPLES
"Everyone complains about the weather but nobody does anything about it.
"
Mark Twain
The previously discussed history of acquisition reform is replete with studies and
legislation aimed at optimizing cost, schedule and performance. Will the current efforts
take root in a culture that has resisted so many previous attempts? Mr. Norm Augustine,
citing budget pressures, the technology revolution, numerous world commitments and a
reform focused Secretary of Defense, stated that the opportunity to reform the acquisition
system has never been better. In an effort to infuse the recent legislation into the culture,
Ms. Colleen Preston, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform), has
consolidated recent initiatives into her "Ten Guiding Principles of Acquisition Reform."
These ten principles summarize what exactly acquisition reform is and what it attempts to
accomplish:
1. Empower People to Manage—Not Avoid Risk
• Delegate authority and results
• Encourage innovation by issuing guidance not rules
• Train in a multifunctional environment
• Commit to quality through customer focus and continuous
improvement
2. Operate in Integrated Product Teams
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• Replace functional stove pipes with integrated program teams
• Manage with early insight on program issues, rather than after-
the-fact oversight
• Resolve issues at the lowest possible management level
• Use concurrent engineering to integrate process and product
development
• Partner & team with industry
3. Reduce Cycle Time by 50%
• Zero-base functional requirements
• Tailor the process to the specific acquisition
• Waive or seek relief from low value added directives
• Structure so that fewer people are involved
and the need for coordination is reduced
4. Reduce Cost of Ownership
• Manage overall life cycle cost not just initial
acquisition cost
• Treat total cost as an independent variable
relative to user requirements
• Make cost performance trade-offs early in the acquisition
process
• Put high priority on logistics and support cost visibility
5. Expand use of Commercial Products and Processes
• Research the global commercial market before establishing
new development efforts
• Begin dialogue with industry early in requirements
development process
• State requirements in terms of essential performance SPECs
• Give priority to customary commercial practices
6. Use Performance SPECs and NON-Government Standards
• Minimize Government unique terms and conditions
• Use performance SPECs as the preferred choice for all
programs
• Use non-Government standards when performance SPECSs
are not practicable
• Use MIL SPECs/STDs only as a last resort with an appropriate
waiver
7. Issue Solicitations that Reflect the Quality of a World Class Buyer
• Write cohesive statements of work that specify "what" not
"how"
• Minimize data requirements to emphasize electronic commerce
and product over paper
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• Integrate oversight requirements with contractor program
management scheme
• Coordinate in advance to gain mutual understanding of
requirements and capabilities
• Maximize use of FACNET and simplified acquisition
procedures
8. Procure Goods & Services with "Best Value" Techniques
• Evaluate bids & proposals on a total cost of ownership basis to
seek out qualities other than lowest price
• Use contractor past performance as a key factor in source
selection
• Reduce the time and cost of making the award
• Debrief offerors promptly and openly to avoid
misunderstanding and protest
9. Test & Inspect in the Least Obtrusive Manner to Add Value
to the Process or Product
• Make testers/evaluators value-added team participants from the
start, not inspectors after-the-fact
• Take advantage of contractor testing
• Use modeling and advanced simulation to save time and reduce
cost
• Achieve quality with statistical process control rather than with
end item inspection
10. Manage Contracts for End Results
• Focus on the customer and the product or service required
• Control only the performance SPEC giving contractors
freedom for design innovation
• Acquire technical data rights only to extent necessary
for breakout and spares procurement
• Aggregate contracts and acquisition phases
to benefit from stable contractor operations
• Operate on the basis of trust and tailor oversight to estimated
performance risk [Ref. 50]
The degree to which these recent reform's "guiding principles" have been "value
added" will determine if, indeed, this is true reform or just another cycle of popular
"buzzwords." The next subchapter discusses recent attempts to measure the outcome of
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efforts thus far and results from pilot programs authorized in FASA. Feedback as to
acquisition reform's impact on the V-22 program is analyzed in Chapter IV.
D. ACQUISITION REFORM BENCHMARKING GROUP (ARBG)
Chartered in September 1995, the ARBG was tasked with determining the results
of current acquisition reform efforts. Metrics baselines were developed using the best
commercial industry and DoD had to offer. General data from DoD and specific data
from five pilot programs were collected and analyzed over a year and a half. The results
of the ARBG efforts were published in June of 1997.
According to the ARBG, some dramatic improvements have occurred as a result
of the most recent acquisition reform efforts. The seven top gains in efficiency, listed in
the Executive Summary of the Final Report, included:
• New Start program development cycles of 88 months versus an historic
average of 1 1 5 months. Post- 1 992 major acquisition programs show a 25
percent reduction in planned cycle time.
• Reported average cost growth of zero (0) for all Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) in 1 996.
• Logistics Response Time (LRT) for both consumable and troop support
items (clothing, medical and subsistence items) continues to improve as a
result of reengineering business practices under Shift to Commercial
Practices (SCP) initiatives, such as prime vendor (PV) and virtual prime
vendor arrangements.
• In a USDA(A&T) survey of MDAP Program managers, $42 billion in
estimated cost reductions. Reduction resulting from regulatory oversight
in the average cost premium of 50 percent.
• "Reinvention Laboratory on Oversight" identified and tested process
improvements and targeted $145 million of annual cost savings and
avoidances.
• A 50 percent reduction in Class I Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs)
[Ref. 46:p. 1-1]
66
The group also concluded that there were still areas that needed more effort.
These areas included:
• Despite significant emphasis on cost as independent variable (CAIV) and
an average cost growth of zero in 1 996, some MDAPs continued to incur
cost growth primarily due to funding instability. Unfunded
contingency operations and underfunded readiness requirements are
leading to a shift of available resources from investment accounts to O&M
accounts. Much of this cost increase was attributed to inadequate
methods for managing technical/financial risk.
• The cost of DoD's purchasing continues to be twice as high as
comparable high technology commercial segments.
• Although product/process conformance has increased, development
programs have not matured sufficiently to assess the effect of acquisition
reform on weapon system performance. [Ref. 46:pp. 1-1,1-2]
The ARBG reported on many acquisition improvements, across the board, and
what MDAP acquisition can look like for new start programs—given certain waivers.
Initial reports are in and they are positive. What it did not report was actual "feedback
from the field" for the majority of the programs that were not "pilot programs." The next




IV. ACQUISITION REFORM AND THE V-22
"A person who has a cat by the tail knows a whole lot more about cats




Since given "history's greatest mulligan" back in 1992, the V-22 program team
has capitalized on the opportunity. Seldom is a program given such a second chance, and
the V-22 team has been more than ready to adapt to the initiatives of acquisition reform.
It has come a long way. In 1996, this once-cancelled program was nominated by the
Naval Air Systems Command for the "David Packard" Excellence in Acquisition Award
and, just recently, received the Department of the Navy's Certificate of Excellence for
Acquisition Reform. The V-22 program has the new acquisition reform "cat by the tail,"
and a great deal can be learned from its experience. This chapter outlines what
acquisition reform measures are in place in the program and the effect they have had. It
then briefly examines the "jointness" of the program. Finally, it discusses
recommendations that the prime contractors suggest may provide continued reform.
B. V-22 ACQUISITION REFORM TOOLBOX
The V-22 program office (PMA-275), as with every program, seeks to be "the
smartest, most responsive buyer of the best goods and services, that meet the warfighter's
needs, at the best value over the life of the product." [Ref. 69] Conforming the V-22
program's mission to DoD mandated acquisition reform has resulted in some initiatives
playing a starting role while others have been sidelined. Accordingly, the use of reform
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initiatives to accomplish "value added" results is paramount—not the use of reform
initiatives, in and of themselves, just to comply with a new DoD project. After a brief
look at an observed shift in the program's business process, this subchapter examines the
addition of acquisition reform's guiding principles, as outlined in Chapter III, to the V-22
program's toolbox and the impact they have had.
With the cyber-paced business world of today, an essential element of successful
management is the ability of the business to learn and adapt to unforeseeable future
forces. A learning company's bottom line is continuous process improvement. Integrated
Definition (IDEF), the recognized process outline for examining Business Process
Reengineering (BPR), recognizes that process throughput is increased as controlling








Figure 4.1, IDEF Process Model [Ref. 61]
This shift has happened with acquisition reform and the V-22. The overwhelming
response from those in the V-22 program to acquisition reform is that it has enabled the
program office to enlist the support of its chain of command instead of avoiding its
scrutiny. This shift has freed the PM and his support team to initiate imaginative
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solutions or save the effort required hiding such work. In an IDEF outline of the
acquisition process, this observed change shifts the chain of command from the status as
a "controller" to one of an "enabler." The chain of command now supports the program
office instead of "watching over it." This freeing up of the V-22 program office to
accomplish its mission is the catalyst for the rest of the efforts listed in this subchapter.
1. Empower People To Manage—Not Avoid Risk
The first principle of acquisition reform, according to the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition Reform) Colleen Preston, is to "empower people to manage—not
avoid risk." Risk management is an important recurring theme in reform. The eleventh
of Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci's thirty-two initiatives back in 1981 called for
increased visibility of technical risk in programs. [Ref. 56] Basic courses in program
management taught at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and throughout the Defense
Acquisition University list effective formal risk management as the quintessential
element of any successful program. V-22 Deputy Program Manager, Barbara Smith,
agrees whole-heartedly and feels that effective risk management is the key to the new
Osprey's success. The program's combination of Earned Value Management (EVM) and
an in-house process, coordinated through both the contractor and the Government, is
recognized by many as the best risk program at NAVAIR.
The EVM system in place with the V-22 program demonstrates to the
Government that Bell Boeing effectively uses cost and schedule management control
systems and permits the Government to track program risk status. The December 1 996
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shift from CSCSC to EVM put greater Government trust in Bell Boeing and reduced the
time and effort expended by the Government in undue oversight. Since the 1 994 shift of
Integrated Baseline Review (IBR) responsibility to the program office from the
comptroller, the program has actively used CSCSC, and now EVM, data to manage the
program and its risks. [Ref. 62]
The tracking of the Integrated Test Team (ITT) progress is a good example of the
use of EVM. Bell Boeing tracks not only flight hours, but also the value achieved in the
flight hours by "event" accomplishment. Figure 4.2 illustrates the tracking of ITT
progress. Planned, earned, actual and scheduled flight time and events are tracked and
variance is calculated. With this information, the ITT, JPO and PMA-275 can identify
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Figure 4.2, ITT Earned Value Management / Risk Management [Ref. 63]
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The V-22 risk management process encourages an open, risk-aware culture in
which risk management is considered everyone's job. Identifying possible risks is
encouraged. This minimizes the unknown risks and makes program planning more
effective. A formal systematic process exists, enabling those in the program to identify,
categorize, assess, analyze, mitigate, monitor and dispose of risks as follows: [Ref. 57:p.
46]
• Risk Identification. Risk is identified through many various means: IPTs,
schedule network analysis, test results, meetings and discussions, technical
performance measurements, cost, schedule and control system and any other
means.
• Risk Characterization. Once identified, a risk is submitted on a risk
identification form. This form is submitted to the Bell Boeing program office
who, in turn, forwards the risk form to PMA-275 and the members of a Risk
Management Control Board (RCB). The RCB rates the risk as high,
moderate, or low and decides whether or not to track the risk. If so, it enters it
into a data base.
• Impact Assessment. "What if?" questions are asked. Impact if no action is
taken, impact if the most likely action is taken and impact of the action itself
are analyzed by the RCB. The worst of the three is entered into the data base.
• Analysis of Plan. After being entered into the database, the risk is analyzed by
the appropriate IPT and a plan for mitigation is developed. This plan is
presented to the RCB for approval on a standard "potential risk item" plan
sheet. Any plans disapproved are revisited later or closed out.
• Mitigation/Implementation of Plan. If required, concurrence from PMA-275
PM, contractor PM, or PCO is obtained, the risk is assigned a permanent
identification number, a planned update is set, and resources and funding
issues are resolved. The planned update is dependent on the requirements of
the mitigation plan. At a minimum, moderate and high risk plans will be
updated on a monthly basis.
• Monitoring Progress. IPTs monitor risks and the RCB reviews them. Risk
status is covered in design reviews and program management reviews.
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• Disposition. All risks are assessed for weekly review by the risk management
team. Upgrade, downgrade, open, close and monitor decisions are made to the
risk status. [Ref. 57:p. 46]
2. Operate In Integrated Product Teams
The operation of integrated product teams (IPTs) and analysis and integration
teams (A&Is) in the program is identified by both the contractors and Government as a
vital catalyst to the V-22 program's jump-start in early EMD and to its continued success
today. The use of IPTs in the V-22 program were in full operation before Secretary of
Defense Perry ushered in the concept May 10, 1995. Boeing had used "multi-discipline
teams" in the successful development of the commercial B-777, F-22 and Hard Mobile
Launcher (HML) and included them in the 1992 V-22 EMD proposal. As Boeing B-777
engineers were assigned to the new Osprey, they brought with them IPT know-how and
expertise. By the summer of 1993, PMA-275 had developed the present IPT concept of
operations, charters for each of the 72 IPTs (currently 74), and a matrix plan to staff all of
them. [Ref. 70]
The IPT Concept of Operations used in the V-22 is a method to optimize
concurrent engineering. Concurrent engineering is "the consideration of all design
aspects at one time in the early stages of the design process" and requires customer input
[Ref. 58:p. 1]. IPT operations are organized into four tiers and a management board:
• Tier IV. Key V-22 Government personnel assigned as Primary IPT
coordinators (PIC). PIC interface directly with bell Boeing counterparts.
Some PICs may be full time IPT members. DCMC personnel are integrated
to provide matrix support but are not tasked to supply procuring agency roles
or responsibilities. The PIC receives assistance from the Design Engineering
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Team (DET), Maintenance Engineering Team (MET), Systems Engineering
Team (SET), Integrated Logistics Support Management Team (ILSMT) and
members of the Assistant Program Manager for Logistics (APML) staff.
• Tier III. Key senior Government personnel will be assigned to this first level
analysis and integration group (A&I). These personnel include SET, Class
Desk (Assistant Program Manager (Science & Technology)) and APML
representatives. These personnel are to coordinate all IPTs in their
cognizance.
• Tier II. The Class desk and APML provide Government interface for the
company level A&I. Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and Critical Design
Reviews are examples of when Tier II interface is required.
• Tier I. The Program Management personnel (PMA) and NAVAIR SET
provide this input. They are assigned to the Air Vehicle A&I. Decisions can
not exceed the terms of the contract as the PCO is the only Government
representative with formal authority to change the terms of the contract.
• V-22 Program Management Board. The PMA-275 Program Manager, PCO,
and Bell Boeing Program Director provide guidance and direction when not
resolvable at the Air Vehicle A&I. Any issues requiring change in terms,
conditions, or price of the contract, are forwarded to this board.
The charters for each of the 74 IPTs include up to six sections. The purpose
section provides the mission statement for the team. The products section lists the end
item deliverables required of the team. The intermediate products section lists the en-
route deliverables needed to get to the end items. The boundaries section lists those
items that limit the scope of the team's efforts. Quality, cost, schedule, technical and
weight are examples of this. The tasks section of the charter includes those actions
required to produce the intermediate and final products. An optional sixth section is the
membership section. It outlines who leads the IPT and who can provide input.
The IPT organization and matrix support includes vital contact data. In the 1 996
report on IPTs by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), communication was linked to
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successful IPTs in the same manner that location is related to real estate. Communication
lines in V-22 IPTs are clear and unencumbered. [Ref. 59]
Co-location and technology were also noted by CNA for optimizing IPT
performance. PMA-275's recent move to Patuxent River Naval Air Station's IPT
building has further enabled it to co-locate a number of its logistic, engineering, financial
and program management personnel. Other matrix staff are either an office away in the
same building or a few blocks away. Where IPT members are separated physically, the
program makes extensive use of their e-mail and video teleconference provided by Bell
Boeing's joint program office—also located at Patuxent River.
3. Reduce Cycle Time by 50 Percent
The cycle time for this program has not been reduced appreciably even though
numerous time saving measures have been incorporated. After analyzing risks involved,
concurrent EMD and LRIP cycles were run to reduce program cycle time. Additionally,
the program attained a waiver from mandatory Government specifications and standards
for the 1996 Bell Boeing LRIP contract. With over 14 years and $5 billion invested in
the program, forcing Bell Boeing to develop new commercial specifications and
standards would have been counter-productive. Bell Boeing was not prepared for the
switch at the time, but has since submitted "single process initiative" (SPI) requests that,
likewise, may reduce cycle time. These SPIs are discussed in greater detail in section
five of this subchapter. One additional time cutting measure of note is the tailoring of
Boeing's "drawing-to-tooling" process. This ten-level process inherited from the B-777
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engineers was pared down to a three-step process. Even with these time saving measures
and the new start back in 1992, the program is not scheduled to reach MV-22 IOC until
2001. [Ref. 62]
The intent of measuring cycle time is to determine how long it takes for a system
to get in a warfighters' hands. One area, at times, overlooked is the fielding time—how
long it will take to field a system to full operating capability (FOC) once it has reached
IOC. From the warfighters' perspective, a long drawn out fielding time can counter any
benefits gained from a reduced cycle time.
A big return in this area of fielding time has been made by the V-22. Recent
efforts by the contractors and the program office to increase the production rate has
shaved off eight years of the life of the buy and the warfighter will have fu.ll capability
sooner. . . and at less cost. The next section discusses this reduction in cost of ownership.
4. Reduce Cost of Ownership
Reduction of the cost of ownership is the fourth guiding principle of acquisition
reform. To accomplish this, the V-22 program manages the overall life cycle cost and
front-end costs, treats cost as an independent variable (CAIV), fights for stability and is
preparing its first multiyear budget proposal.
The 1 994 Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) Acquisition Decision Memorandum
(ADM) limited annual V-22 outlays to $1 billion. This, in effect, exchanged the most
efficient cost of ownership for near-term fiscal savings. On 1 October 1996, Bell Boeing
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executives met with Under Secretary of Defense Kaminski to address this issue and made
three recommendations:
• Increase first three MV-22 lots to: 5/FY97-1 2/FY98-24/FY99 and 36/FY00
• Establish joint commercial practices/contractor logistics support team.
• Prepare multi-year procurement proposal [Ref. 60]
Since then, the results of the QDR endorsed the need for an increased
procurement rate, but not at the originally recommended level. The program has been
able to increase its procurement to 5 for FY- 1997, 7 for FY- 1998 and FY- 1999 and
sustain procurement from FY-2004 on at 30. This would have driven total costs down,
but a reduction in total production quantity from 523 to 458 countered these efforts. The
flyaway price per aircraft remains approximately $32 million—23 percent lower than the
FSD cost of $4 1 .8 million. [Ref. 66]
The program has put a high priority on reducing logistics and support costs.
Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) recently has been approved for the V-22's largest
commercial item, the AE-1107C engine. CLS is still being considered for the Bell
Boeing airframe itself. The recent contract with Allison Engine Company, the prime
contractor supplying the engines as Government furnished equipment (GFE), is a
textbook example of how a program can use acquisition reform to reduce the life cycle
cost of the program.
In response to a "what, not how" RFP, Allison presented two offers: a nine inch
thick standard response, and one quarter inch thick acquisition reform response. Allison
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recommended a standard three-tier maintenance option and an Operational to Depot (O to
D) concept similar to the way they support major airlines. This Power By The Hour®
support system resembles a reliability improvement warranty with a commercial depot.
After thorough analysis, the PMA-275 logistics personnel discovered, with a few key
improvements, that the O to D program could, in fact, save approximately 30 percent in
support costs from the proposed alternative three tier maintenance system used
throughout the services today. Up front acquisition costs would increase from $1.8
million to $2.1 million per engine, but this would be more than compensated for by total
coast of ownership savings from the Power By The Hour® O to D support program.
Power By The Hour®, a concept borrowed from Allison's parent company Rolls
Royce, is a bit of a misnomer. "Power by the equivalent specification mission hour"
(ESMH) is more in line with what this program entails. ESMH is the result of converting
various life damage factors to a mission hour equivalent. Normal operation of an engine
includes a certain degree of wear to selected dynamic and hot section components over
the life of the engine. Stress rupture/hot corrosion (SR/HC) and 21 low cycle fatigue
(LCF) factors determine this wear. As an engine is operated, these factors are
accumulated. The harder an engine is worked during a mission, the more stress factors
are accumulated. Military Engine Performance Specification 937 describes five missions
that the V-22's engine will endure:
• Vertical Assault
• Search and Rescue
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• Special Operations
• Post Maintenance Check Flights/Test Flights
• Cargo Flights [Ref. 64]
The program office estimated how much of each flight regime was anticipated by
the engines and weighted the missions accordingly. With this mix, an expected 10,000
ESMH life of the contract was factored per engine to get the useful life of the engine.
The resultant expected life at $200 per ESMH is the cost of the program support.
The risk in this process is in the determination of mission load. The engine LCF
and SR/HC accumulate a lot more quickly in a MILPRF 937 test mission than in a SOF
mission. The former includes great engine and dynamic component fluctuation and the
latter does not. However, repeated rugged training for a SOF mission that only entails a
brief period of high engine workload may produce similar engine wear. The degree that
the engines parallel the predicted workload will determine, ultimately, how successful
this contract is for the Government and Allison as well. [Ref. 64]
Sun Tzu said, "Opportunities multiply as they are seized." Acquisition reform
provides many opportunities for those imaginative and courageous enough to seize them.
Allison, it appears, has done just this. Whether or not Bell and Boeing try to enter into
the CLS arena is yet to be determined. Both Government and Boeing representatives
inferred that Boeing is actively seeking to provide CLS for the airframe. However, some
believe that with its high degree of current business, Bell has not felt the "pinch"
financially enough to seek out new methods for retaining future Government business.
Power By The Hour® is a means for Allison to guarantee business until 2045, the
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expected end of V-22 service life. Of course, Allison must deliver a good product, but
the vehicle exists for Allison to survive possible continued future budget cuts in defense.
CLS could provide the same stability for both Bell and Boeing.
Throughout the life of the V-22 acquisition process, CAIV has been applied to
ensure program affordability. CAIV is a twofold process. Initially, it is a planning
activity to establish and adjust program cost objectives (procurement cost and operations
and support costs) through cost-performance trade-offs. Thereafter, CAIV is an
execution tool used to stay within the cost objectives set in planning. In this aspect of the
CAIV process, the cost objective is translated into a specific design using design to cost
(DTC) and cost of ownership techniques. Inherent in both is the requirement to establish
and track cost metrics.
Both aspects of CAIV are present in the V-22 program's CAIV Program
Implementation Plan. Up-front analysis and affordability trade studies are used along
with best value analysis to determine the biggest "bang for the buck." After cost
objectives are set, the funding profile baseline subtotals for RDT&E, PROC, MILCON
and O&S are used as benchmarks for the later execution portion of the CAIV plan. The
execution portion of the V-22 CAIV Program Implementation Plan includes both current
and future cost reduction initiatives.
The V-22 CAIV program includes four current cost reduction initiatives:
• Setting realistic and aggressive cost objectives
• Managing risk to achieve cost, schedule and performance objectives
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• Devising appropriate metrics for tracking progress in setting and achieving
cost objectives
• Motivating and incentivizing Government and industry managers to achieve
program objectives
The V-22 CAIV program includes five future reduction initiatives:
• Integrated Logistics Support
• 2001 upgrade
• Multi-year production
• O&S cost drivers
• V-22 process improvement program (Value Engineering)
Returns from the V-22 CAIV program have resulted from both the current and
future initiative areas. One notable example of current initiatives was the cutting of FSD
flyaway cost by 20 percent. The EMD fly-away cost target of $33.4 million was actually
reduced even further to $32 million, as stated earlier. A notable future initiative example
is the embedding of various radio assemblies into the ARC-210 radio. This initiative is
saving $120,000 per aircraft and $54,960,000 across the program. Additional savings in
future initiatives could be realized by CLS, but as this is a current contract issue, O&S
figures are not releasable.
CAIV progress is tracked with metrics. This is done on a macro and micro level.
In 1 996, the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) set the baseline for the program's
CAIV program in four budget areas: research, development, test and evaluation
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(RDT&E), procurement (PROC), military construction (MILCON) and operations and
support (O&S). Cost comparison is conducted every six months to track the plan's
progress. One example of the many metrics on the micro level is the systems engineering
metric of cost. After initial targets were set for flyaway cost and O&S cost, these targets
were passed down to the IPTs for action. The design to cost (DTC) member of each IPT
then presented the challenge before team members who collectively established metrics
and met each challenge. One IPT devised a way to reduce 36 parts into one single
casting, reducing machine time by 70 percent and recurring costs by more than 50
percent. [Ref. 71]
Effective cost management of the V-22 program includes fighting program
funding instability. This instability for DoD and the V-22 program has been heightened
by recent contingency operations. Contingencies, invariably require more funding than
initially anticipated. Figure 4.3, at the top of the next page, illustrates this funding
variance. The services offset this operational variance with acquisition funding. Each
service chooses the manner in which to transfer these funds, but nonetheless, an average
of $2 billion in investment funding (PROC and RDT&E) migrates each year to operations
and support (O&S) for contingencies.
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Figure 4.3, DoD Operational Contingencies Funding [Ref. 61]
One method the Navy uses to pay for its share of these contingencies is to transfer
a percent of each acquisition program's funding over to O&S. This post appropriation
"taxation" of the program's funding can be likened to a renegade teenager's sporadic use
of a parent's credit card. Financial planning is never solid due to the ever-present
possibility that funding, thought to be secure, can be pulled at any moment. Figure 4.4
illustrates the amount of "taxation" the V-22 program has suffered in the past years. This
"taxation" is singled out by the V-22 PM, COL Nolan Schmidt, as the number one issue
that must still be addressed by future acquisition reform efforts. A $3 billion bill before
Congress to fund the contingencies in Bosnia and Iraq, external to the defense budget, is
an interesting recent development and could reduce the instability on major defense
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Figure 4.4, Taxation of V-22 Funding [Ref. 62]
One final area of effort by the V-22 program to lower life cycle costs is in the use
of multi-year contracting. This had been recommended as far back as the Packard
Commission report, but the recent emphasis by acquisition reform has made this a reality.
The V-22 program is currently putting together its first multi-year proposal. The returns
from a multi-year contract should be a three to four percent savings. [Ref. 66]
5. Expand Use of Commercial Products and Processes
The fifth guiding principle is the expanded use of commercial products and
practices. This section outlines related program efforts and results. First, a list of initial
EMD phase commercial products and processes is outlined. This is followed by a look at
a cutting edge electronic technical manual program. An examination of the single
process initiative's impact on the program wraps up the section.
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a) Commercial Products and Processes
The list below from the Navy's acquisition reform "Navy Success Stories"
homepage sums up an impressive array of commercial products and processes used in the
V-22 program since its transition from full scale development (FSD) to engineering
manufacturing and development (EMD) in 1992 [Ref. 68 :p. 2]:
• Concurrent Product Definition - Integrated product teams
simultaneously commence all product life-cycle activities from
concept definition through final disposal. Subsequent manufacturing
and engineering activities are conducted in parallel.
Digital Design Applications - Computer Aided 3-Dimensional
Interactive Application(TM) (CATIA) is a commercially available
product which provides a single-source, sole authority, digital database
for engineering, manufacturing and test. It allows 1 00% digital product
definition (a paperless design); real-time, remote design participation
by subcontractors; eliminates mockups, master models and gauges;
and supports digital tool applications in the manufacturing process. A
Boeing adaptation to CATIA called "Fly-Through" permits designers
and manufacturers to digitally pre-assemble the aircraft, thus
visualizing design definitions and allowing the resolution ofproblems
prior to assembly. The use of a single database by all manufacturers
results in accurate production at hundreds of locations worldwide.
These digital design applications have assisted in reducing the aircraft
part count by 36%; reducing fastener count by 34%;
reducing error change and rework drawings by 85%; and reducing
composite material scrap by 74%.
• Fiber Placement - An automated method of laying graphite material on
a compound curvature, this process harnesses CATIA to a large,
numerically controlled composite tool, resulting in the fabrication of
large components that are stronger, lighter and cheaper than
comparable hand laid ones. The process has resulted in a 66% savings
in man-hours and an assembly cost reduction of over 90%.
Additionally, the process is repeatable and easy to modify.
Advanced Technology Assembly - A process that reduces the number
of assembly jigs, tooling locators and the time to set them up, resulting
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in tighter tolerances, more accurate location of parts, reduced man-
hours and the virtual elimination of shims in the assembly process.
Integrated Wiring System - Replacing the "spider web" wiring in most
aircraft, these woven ribbon cables separated by shield foil to prevent
cross-talk and electromagnetic interference, provide significant cost,
weight and space savings. Fabrication is simple and repeatable.
Weight Reduction Program - As the aircraft transitioned to production,
an aggressive weight reduction program was initiated which re-
evaluated the entire structure of the FSD airframe. Trade studies
examined current and new designs for affordability, functionality and
ease of manufacture. An expanded use of "Design-to-Cost" metrics
was developed to serve as an engineering tool for assessing the new
designs. The resulting EMD design, executed with high speed milling
and fiber placement processes, has eliminated over 1 800 pounds from
the FSD design. [Ref. 68 :p. 2]
b) Interactive Electronic Technical Manual (IETM)
Additionally, the program is working on a level four interactive electronic
technical manual (IETM). An IETM provides proficiency level appropriate direction for
aircraft maintenance personnel. A ruggedized portable IETM is hooked up to the aircraft
and the aircraft provides data as to what components require maintenance. The IETM
then provides guidance on how best to accomplish it. As technology improves, the
program has incorporated a pre-planned-product improvement (P3I) to upgrade the
system to a fully interactive level five IETM.
c) Single Process Initiative
The single process initiative (SPI), as outlined in the last chapter, provides
a method to implement acquisition reform's goals into ongoing contracts. By eliminating
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redundant "no value added" processes, it is intended to reduce contractor operating cost
and produce cost, schedule and performance benefits for the Government. This initiative
is crucial to acquisition reform's implementation for ongoing programs like the V-22.
The single process initiative has been embraced by the contractors, who
have submitted no less than 45 SPI recommendations for V-22 production facilities. Bell
Helicopter Textron has submitted 13, Allison Engine Company 1 1 and Boeing Vertol 21.
Not all SPIs submitted are approved, however. The 1 20 day approval process, illustrated
in Figure 4.5, separates the wheat from the chaff. Of those initiatives submitted roughly
one third have been refused. Illustrated in Figure 4.5 is Boeing's process for the V-22.
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Figure 4.5, V-22 Single Process Initiative Process [Ref. 68]
88
Mr. Scott Hyde, SPI coordinator for PMA-275, has mixed emotions over
the results. An SPI is most likely approved if it is helpful to the contractor, provided the
Government is not adversely affected. Contractors have been able to save time and cost
and, in following, schedule and contract integrity are enhanced. Each SPI proposal has
had little if any direct financial reward for the Government, however, as explained by Mr.
Hyde.
This saves time and money. ..or it should. Time is definitely saved for the
contractor as it is no longer jumping over one inspection into another.
However, cost savings are not passed on to the Government. Each item
found for SPI is labeled too insignificant an amount of savings to
renegotiate the contract—a time consuming process. This means that the
contractor saves, but the cost savings are not passed on.... [Ref. 69]
6. Use Performance Specifications and Non-Government Standards
The sixth guiding principle of acquisition reform is the use of performance
specifications, elimination of detail specifications and, if possible, the use of non-
Government standards. Those current specifications and standards that are practicable to
change are being changed but the majority of the V-22's design work was done prior to
the related June, 1994, Secretary Perry memorandum, and the program's use of them
continues with a waiver.
Since Secretary Perry's memo, PMA-275 has included contract language to
encourage contractors to respond with new innovative approaches. The new contracts for
a full flight simulator (FFS) with Flight Safety International (FSI) and the production
engine contract with Allison Engine Company are notable examples of this. The
specifications drafted for the FFS were done envisioning a Federal Aviation
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Administration (FAA) qualification process. The recent commercial item engine contract
incorporating Power By The Hour® contractor logistic support, is built to MILPRF 937, a
performance specification agreed to by Allison and PMA-275 because there was no
comparable commercial equivalent. Detail specifications were scrubbed out of the
program.
Many of the initial military specifications and standards are still appropriate for
the V-22 aircraft. The majority of the aircraft's specifications and standards were set for
the program more than a decade ago. Too much would be involved in switching them.
Some may not have commercial equivalents. Those that are switched through the SPI
process do not result in direct cost savings for the Government, as discussed in the
previous section.
7. Issue Solicitations that Reflect the Quality of a World Class Buyer
From before the 1992 EMD solicitation, Secretary of the Navy O'Keefe had
determined that Bell Boeing would be given an open opportunity to bring cost down and
performance up. Stifling Government requirements and oversight had resulted in an
average Government contract's costing 18 percent more than comparable commercial
contracts. A painfully short "what, not how" solicitation was issued to Bell Boeing
providing only the required performance parameters and the amount of funding available.
With this solicitation, the Government started its effort toward being a "world class
buyer." This effort has come to include: integration of oversight requirements with the
contractor's program management scheme, coordination in advance to gain mutual
90
understanding of requirements and capabilities, and optimization of the use of electronic
data interchange.
Integrating oversight responsibility goes hand-in-hand with the IPT structure, ITT
focus and the military operational test team (MOTT) mission. All three integrate
Government representatives with contractor representatives in an effort to provide timely
oversight and feedback.
The V-22 program coordinates in advance with the contractors to eliminate
confusion. Before the FFS RFP was released, representatives from the contractor and the
Government met to establish just what would be required. This took place for the recent
Allison engine contract, as well. The co-location of the contractors and Government was
noted by those interviewed as extremely helpful in both processes.
The use of the computer to send and receive data is a blessing but the "paperless
office" will only happen if humans are given better eyeballs or somehow the fatiguing
process of scrolling through page after page on the computer screen is improved. The V-
22 Deputy Program Manager raised doubts about the reported successes with paperless
offices as she stated, "I challenge anyone to scroll through a 1 00 page technical paper on
the computer." The system is able to get data to the office electronically, but when it is
actually read, it is printed out first. [Ref. 64]
Data requirements in the program have been reduced from approximately 500 for
EMD, of which 250 are transmitted electronically, to 83 for LRIP, of which 42 are
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transmitted electronically. Though the EMD phase, by nature, requires more data
requirements, the reduction is still noteworthy. [Ref. 72]
8. Procure Goods & Services with "Best Value" Techniques
The eighth guiding principle is to utilize "Best Value" techniques. This principle
is all encompassing. To get the best value, one must take more into account than just the
price. All of acquisition reform's guiding principles are relevant. If the V-22's price is
low, but the aircraft breaks down too often, it has not been a good value. According to
contractor and Government personnel interviewed, this has been common sense
acquisition for some time. However, recent emphasis has enabled the program to lower
life cycle costs with higher initial acquisition costs accepted by Congress.
A "Best Value" approach has been taken across the board but it is not always in
line with CAIV. If the item is at or below a specification's cost/performance desired level
but above the threshold, then a CAIV approach and "Best Value" approach are one and
the same. However, if the item is above the specification's cost/performance requirement,
even though it may be a "Best Value," it is considered "gold plating." This is illustrated
in a diagram (Figure 4.6) Ms. Barbara Smith, PMA-275 Deputy Program Manager, used
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Figure 4.6, Best Value and CAIV [Ref. 64]
One issue, similar to a commercial industry's "marrying the supplier," is
appropriate use of sole-sourcing. The lowest price is not always achieved, but contractor
performance can be counted on. In the V-22 program, no one contested Bell Boeing for
the production of the tiltrotor. By default, it was sole-source. Sole-source contract
processing time, up until acquisition reform, depended on the amount of negotiation
required and the levels of authorization required for approval. Acquisition reform has
helped the V-22 program by eliminating this latter factor of bureaucracy. The V-22's
Primary Contracting Officer (PCO), Roger Henry, told the author, "The best thing
acquisition reform has done, is waive the sole-source reporting requirements, and
delegate them from DoD to the commander of NAVAIR. This empowerment of the
command speeds up the process tremendously." [Ref. 67]
9. Test & Inspect in the Least Obtrusive Manner to Add Value
Testing and inspecting, the ninth guiding principle, encourages building quality
into the product up-front in order to minimize costly and often "no non-value added" end
item testing later on. This initiative has had mixed returns with the V-22 program. Great
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success in testing quality into the aircraft is achieved by the concurrent
contractor/Government test and maintenance programs. Additionally, the increased use
of commercial modeling technology significantly builds quality into the program.
However, recent schedule pressure has resulted in poor deliverable quality and forced the
Government to inspect each and every end item.
One area that the PM for the V-22 believes has greatly contributed to the success
of the program is the integrated test team (ITT) and maintenance operational test team
(MOTT). Early on, both the contractors and the Government insisted that
testers/evaluators be value-added team participants from the start, not inspectors after-the-
fact. This has eliminated a great deal of duplicative testing. The program has reduced the
test time required 72 percent from 5 months to 6 weeks. Each flight that goes up has a
military test pilot and a commercial test pilot. Contractor testing is fully optimized.
Likewise, both contractor and Government maintainers complete each maintenance
action that takes place. The inclusion of the user has increased "ownership" of the
aircraft's developmental successes and failures by all testers and maintainers. If anything
goes wrong, both the Government and contractors have ownership of the problem and
"finger-pointing" does not take place. Likewise, successes are truly recognized as the V-
22 team's and not jealously regarded by any of the testers and maintainers.
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Another successful initiative is the use of computer aided design, computer aided
manufacturing and computer aided engineering (CAD/CAM/CAE). This use of
modeling and advanced simulation, as described in section five, saves time and reduces
cost. By using a virtual component, expensive physical models are not required.
The program would like to achieve quality with statistical process control (SPC)
rather than with end item inspection, but there have been two issues which prohibit this
from occurring. First, there are not enough items produced, as of yet, to achieve a valid
population from which to derive normalcy information, which is required to conduct
statistical process control. As more aircraft are produced, SPC may be feasible. Second,
and more disturbing, Bell Boeing is currently behind schedule with certain deliverables,
and the rush to expedite them has decreased their overall quality. Aircraft arrive at
Patuxent River Naval Air Station having been "thrown together" just to meet schedule.
Additionally, aircraft arrive without having recent design modifications incorporated
[Ref. 63]. This only slows the program even further and increases the pressure to "rush"
at the expense of quality. Though the Government had initially planned on inspecting
one of five or one of ten deliverable items in a lot, defect rates compel inspection of each
and every item. [Ref. 73]
10. Manage Contracts for End Results
Managing contracts for end results requires contracting with a performance
specification to allow freedom for design innovation, focusing on the customer and the
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service required. Technical data rights/package (TDR/P) is acquired only to the extent
necessary.
Since the acquisition for the V-22 has been sole-source, the freedom for design
has been provided by simple paragraphs in solicitations that, essentially, provide the
contractor the opportunity to respond with innovation.
By focusing on the customer, PMA-275 has been able to recognize which
performance requirements are "hard" and which are not. One example would be the need
for the V-22 to achieve 345 knots. The V-22 can achieve 343 knots. Does the user
consider this critical? In a CH-46E today it may be impossible to differentiate two knots
of airspeed because the aircraft shakes so much. PMA-275 chose to fight for the program
instead of acquiescing and switching to another helicopter. The user needs the
capabilities of the V-22. Always being mindful of the needs of the user compelled the
program to bring Marine and Air Force maintainers into the program early to provide
input and, later, have a user knowledge base in place when the program reaches IOC in
2001.
The latter of these two, the knowledge base, is a current area of concern with
those in the program. The knowledge base may not fully materialize unless Marine
Manpower can figure a way to waive overseas control date requirements for V-22
maintainers. A recent control date is required for promotion for all Marines—including
aviation mechanics. The problem is that there are no V-22 units overseas for these
Marine mechanics to support and their serving in another capacity reduces their V-22
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proficiency. While sharing hardship and time away from families is noble and fair, the
Marine Corps might be better served if these few Marines were not given an opportunity
to lose perishable skills. Moreover, these experienced maintainers are prime targets for
Bell and Boeing. As a maintainer finishing up three years with the V-22 MOTT, the
choices are either to go overseas (perhaps away from family) in order to get promoted and
stay in the Marine Corps, or to join the lucrative civilian tiltrotor effort and stay with
family. Both options drain the knowledge base required for the program to kick off in
2001. [Ref 74]
The most recent commercial contract with Allison illustrates just how to contract
for a system's technical data rights/package to satisfy both the Government's and
contractor's interests. The two important issues are 1 ) the rights to produce a system and
2) the package, itself, containing the technical information with which to do this. The
technical data rights for the commercially developed AE-1107C engine was a sticking
point in recent negotiations until a "win-win" compromise was reached.
Ownership of technical data rights is dependent on to what degree an item/process
is developed with Government funding. The more a contractor develops an item/process,
the more it is proprietary in nature. The whole collection of items/processes makes up a
technical data package. It is possible that the Government could have a technical data
package and not be able to do anything with it because it did not have required rights to
the item/process.
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Both Allison and the Government need data rights. Allison was willing to forfeit
the contract to retain the technical data rights to the AE-1107C engine. With full data
rights, the Government, if it so desired, could approach a competitor, like General
Electric, and ask it to use the rights to build the engines for the Government. While
General Electric had possession of the rights, it could legally produce the engines for the
commercial market as well. This, obviously, would not benefit Allison, who anticipates
selling approximately 1 4,000 similar engines to the commercial market. [Ref. 64]
The Government required the data rights to ensure future engine producibility
should Allison, for any reason, not be capable of producing the engine. The PCO devised
a plan for the Government to retain the technical data rights and package with the
stipulation that the rights would be leased to Allison for the life of the contract. This
protected Allison from a potential competitor's use of the engine.
One further concern the Government had was that Allison might "buy in" with
this contract only to increase support costs in the following contract, roughly seven years
from now. Moreover, Allison might refuse to produce the engine for the Government
entirely, requiring the Government to ramp up another company at great cost. To ensure
these events did not happen, the PCO included language ensuring $200 per ESMH in
perpetuity at constant FY-1997 dollars and the shifting of "Government use only" data
rights to the Government. Should Allison pull out of the contract, use of the data rights
to supply more lucrative customers would be prohibited. [Ref. 64]
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The addition of acquisition reform initiatives in the V-22 program's toolbox has
helped the program accomplish some "value added" results. The business process of the
program has shifted radically. No longer is the chain of command viewed as a constraint
but is now seen as an enabling mechanism. An application of acquisition reform guiding
principles to the V-22 program reveals that this new way of doing business can bring
substantial return, even for an ongoing program. It also reveals that more can be
accomplished. The next subchapter provides a brief look at the program's "joint" aspect.
C. V-22 PROGRAM "JOINT" OBSERVATIONS
Since the initial JSOR, personnel from different services have worked side by side
to acquire leap-ahead vertical lift technology. Deputy Program Manager, Barbara Smith,
recognized numerous contributions that the Air Force members of the program had made
over the years. The up-front maintenance and test team integration and IETMs are just a
couple examples. The current coordination of the different acquisition personnel and
cultures in this venture are the subject of this brief subchapter. First, the position of the
CV-22 project manager is examined. Next, the cultural strengths and weaknesses of the
different services are discussed.
Though initially "joint," the V-22 program is officially not "joint." According to
the defense acquisition deskbook (DAD), "joint" applies to a program that receives
funding from at least two separate Services. The lead Service, the Navy, is funding all
current RDT&E efforts. The Air Force will fund only procurement of its CV-22
aircraft—in accordance with the 1994 ADM guidance. However, procurement refit of
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aircraft number nine will occur in FY-1999~just around the corner. Once this occurs, the
nature of the program may change to become, once again, truly "joint."
The office structure and interaction reflect the unique status of the program..
Though all Air Force personnel interviewed enthusiastically commented on the degree of
consideration the program's Marine PM showed for Air Force needs, they were also quick
to point out that the V-22 is not a "joint program" but "multi-Service." If it were joint,
they would have great deal more input as to how the program is run. With no funding in
the program, as of yet, the Air Force relies on the good will of the Navy and Marine
Corps. To enhance the Air Force influence on the program, the Air Force maintains clout
by positioning an experienced Colonel in the CV-22 project manager position. The
Marine equivalent project manager is a Lieutenant Colonel. Additional benefits from this
"heavy hitter" in the program relate more within the Air Force itself. Two other Program
Executive Officers (PEOs) within the Air Force have interest in the V-22 program. One,
representing the USAF, is a Brigadier General, and the other, representing the AFSOC, is
a Colonel. The CV-22 Project Manager must report to not only the V-22 PM and PEO,
but, unofficially, to these two Air Force officers as well. [Ref. 75]
There is a cultural difference between the Air Force and the Navy. The Air Force,
by nature is more directive. Having been spawned in the early nuclear weapons race
when strict accountability was essential, operational decisions have rested with senior
officers. The Navy, by the nature of command at sea, has empowered its officers to take
initiative, once given broad guidance. This cultural difference is evident, as well, in the
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responsibility given respective pilots. Air Force pilots may not sign their operational
flight plans. This is done by their unit's operations department. All Navy and Marine
pilots have this authority to sign their own flight plans. The cultural differences between
the services reflect upon their views on acquisition reform.
In discussing the reform accomplishments between the services, MAJ Legge,
Assistant Project Manager for the CV-22 (SOCOM version of the V-22), noted both
strengths and weaknesses in each culture. The directive nature of the Air force produced
the "375 series" from which the present acquisition system is derived. However, in the
Air Force, this direction translates into a lot of "non value added" work. One brief after
another is given to assure the leadership that a program is complying with acquisition
guidance. The acquisition reform "lightening bolts" are solid tools, but they must be
tailored to a program and not just be given lip-service. Pressure to sound and look good
is strong. The bureaucracy is alive and well. In the Navy, the culture allows a great deal
of initiative to be taken by the PM. Though the program may feel it gives too many
briefs and that they are too structured, the briefs are far less so than equivalent Air Force
requirements. Whereas the V-22 program uses one or two slides in briefing acquisition
reform, the Air force uses eleven. The Air Force requires much more paperwork. The
strength the Navy has in this area can be a weakness as well. In the Navy culture,
because there is less oversight, a program is only as capable its empowered officers. If
someone is empowered who does not possess the requisite skills or experience, a program
may not recover.
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The makeup and training for those in a program office is different as well.
Though PMA-275 has 72 of the 74 personnel attached to the program level two or level
three DAWIA certified, only a handful of them are trained in program management.
They are senior officers. In Air Force programs, numerous junior officers, trained in
program management, assist in the management of the program. In the Navy, though
many supporting personnel are co-located in the office itself, others are matrixed program
members of other offices and commands. The Air Force includes everyone in the office.
Co-location is very important. The office is more like a command, in and of itself, with
the PM acting as a Commanding Officer.
Overall, the services differ in their approaches, but are working well together at
PMA-275. The best of both cultures has emerged and should serve as an exemplar for
future "joint" and "multi-service" acquisition.
D. CONTRACTOR INPUT
Response from contractor personnel toward acquisition reform is extremely
positive. Many contractors, having been in the military themselves at one time or
another, are excited that Marines and Airmen are receiving a quality product and they
give credit to the initiatives of acquisition reform. The only negative aspect mentioned is
that it has not occurred earlier and that it has not gone far enough. According to Bruce
Potocki of Boeing, "There are still many statutory and regulatory changes that need to be
made to eliminate Government mandates that conflict with commercial practices and
processes." Mr. Potocki, winner of the DSMC Acquisition Research Symposium "David
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D. Acker" award, recommends a change of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR) to accommodate dual use production lines. Norbert Josten of Boeing
recommended that the "core requirements" restriction on depot support be re-examined.
These laws, he feels, are a result of the old paradigm that only the depot could be relied
upon to spool up for war. With today's technology and laws to support military industry,
Boeing, Bell, Allison and any other contractor can be relied upon, in time of national
emergency, to provide support similar to military depots.
E. CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined what acquisition reform measures are in place with the
V-22 program and the effect they have had, the cultures of the services at PMA-275, and
the views of some of the contract personnel. A transformation of the business process
from the top-down has enabled the program office and its prime contractors to optimize
cost, schedule and performance innovatively. Earned value management metrics are
actively incorporated into the program's risk management process. Cross-functional
IPTs, as the backbone of the program, break down "stove pipes" and facilitate concurrent
engineering. The program looks at the overall cost of ownership and has successfully
implemented initiatives like CAIV and CLS. Funding instability continues to haunt the
program due to annual shifting of acquisition funds to contingency O&S funds.
Commercial products and processes, from massive CATIA graphite fiber placement
machines to IETMs return the most quality for the program dollar. Though many of the
MILSPECS and standards remain from the pre-reform development phases, those that
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can be removed or deleted prudently have been. Commercial item acquisition of the AE-
1107C is a case study of how to effectively use acquisition reform to minimize O&S
costs. "Best Value," within a budget, is sought in all decisions. Savvy "win-win"
contracting has ensured an end result that saves 30 percent in support costs and
incentivizes improved reliability.
Cultures within the Navy and Air Force have both strengths and weaknesses.
These strengths and weaknesses impact how the two Services act on acquisition reform
initiatives. In the V-22 program, the Services' cultures have complimented each other.
Much is being accomplished with acquisition reform in the V-22 program and
DoD. However, There are still statutory and regulatory changes that commercial industry
believes are needed to achieve further reform. The "core" weapons restrictions and ITAR
are two examples of regulations that should be addressed in future reform efforts. Further
conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapter V.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis provides background information on the once-cancelled V-22 program
and acquisition reform and then examines the impact of the latter on the former. It
analyzes the V-22 program using DoD's "ten guiding principles of acquisition reform" as
a standard and concludes that acquisition reform is having mixed results on this Major
Defense Acquisition Program.
Much is being accomplished with acquisition reform in the V-22 program. A
transformation of the business process from the top down is enabling the program office
and its prime contractors to optimize cost, schedule and performance innovatively.
Earned value management metrics are actively being incorporated into the program's risk
management process. Concurrent contractor/Government testing and maintenance
reduces test time required by 72 percent. Cross-functional IPTs, as the backbone of the
program, are breaking down "stove pipes" and facilitating concurrent engineering.
Successfully implementing initiatives like CAIV and CLS are reducing total ownership
cost of the program—cradle to grave. Commercial products and processes, like the
Allison AE-1107C engine and CATIA software, are providing high quality systems at
market controlled prices. Commercial item acquisition and CLS are being used
effectively to minimize life cycle costs. "Win-Win" contracting with industry is
providing engines whose reliability should actually improve with time and reduce support
costs by over 30 percent.
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Much remains to be accomplished. Funding instability continues to haunt the V-
22 program due to frequent re-programming of DoD acquisition funds to contingency
O&S funding. SPI, a primary vehicle intended to usher acquisition reform into ongoing
contracts, benefits contractors but has failed, at least initially, to return any direct savings
to the program office. Finally, contractor input suggests that core requirements and ITAR
should be revamped to take advantage of industrial capacity and streamlined methods.
However, Congress has constrained DoD decisions on core versus CLS.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
IPTs, CLS, EVM, commercial products and processes, "what, not how,"
solicitation, performance specifications, commercial item acquisition and CAIV are
"value added" tools to the V-22 program that should achieve beneficial results in other
acquisitions as well.
Acquisition reform opens numerous opportunities for learning organizations to
benefit. Both Government and contractor organizations should continue to seek ways to
improve upon the acquisition process.
Realistic contingency funding should be included in fiscal budgets to mitigate risk
from unforeseen obstacles. A recent $3 billion contingency bill that is separate from
budgeted DoD funding is one possible method. This approach could avoid very costly
disruption that occurs when acquisition program funding must be decremented.
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The SPI should be altered to pass a proportion of any program-related savings
back to the program office. With no direct benefit from SPI and the effort required to
track it, program offices get "no value added" from the initiative, as it stands.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What are the effects of acquisition reform on PMA-275, Bell Boeing,
and Allison in the execution and delivery of the V-22 Osprey?
The effects of acquisition reform on PMA-275, Bell Boeing and Allison are
summarized in the conclusion section of this chapter and are covered in detail in Chapter
IV. Overall effect of acquisition reform on PM V-22 and each of the prime contractors
has been a more efficient process.
2. What are the background and history of the V-22 Osprey program?
The history of the V-22 program is addressed in some detail in Chapter II.
3. What are the principles of acquisition reform and why are they
important?
Ms. Colleen Preston, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition
Reform), summarized what acquisition reform is and what it is intended to achieve in her
"Ten Guiding Principles of Acquisition Reform." The researcher gauged the V-22
Osprey program by comparing it to each of her ten principles:
1
.
Empower People to Manage—Not Avoid Risk
2. Operate in Integrated Product Teams
3. Reduce cycle Time by 50 Percent
4. Reduce Cost of Ownership
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5. Expand use of Commercial Products and Processes
6. Use Performance SPECs and NON-Government Standards
7. Issue Solicitations that Reflect the Quality of a World Class Buyer
8. Procure Goods & Services with "Best Value" Techniques
9. Test & Inspect in the Least Obtrusive Manner to Add Value
to the Process or Product
10. Manage Contracts for End Results [Ref. 50]
4. How have PMA-275 and the contractors applied acquisition reform to
the V-22 Osprey program?
PMA-275 and the contractors have applied acquisition reform in a number of
ways. As this is pivotal to the primary research question, this chapter's conclusion
section summarizes the ways PMA-275 and the contractors have applied acquisition
reform and the effect this reform has had. Chapter IV analyzes the program's use of
acquisition reform, in greater depth, against the "guiding principles of acquisition
reform."
5. How are the effects of acquisition reform measured in the V-22
Osprey program?
The effects of acquisition reform are measured by earned value management
system (EVMS) metrics to track the progress and cost of the program. Pertinent cost and
schedule data are gathered and analyzed in each of the 74 IPTs. This is covered in greater
detail in Chapter IV.
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6. What are the future implications of acquisition reform on the V-22
Osprey program?
Acquisition reform has been the vehicle for numerous improvements in program
cost, schedule, and performance, and will continue in this vein in the future. As
OPEVAL, MS III and IOC draw near, acquisition reform will free PMA-275 to be "the
smartest, most responsive buyer, of the best goods and services, that meet the of the
warfighter's needs, at the best value over the life of the product." This is covered in
greater detail in Chapter IV. [Ref. 69]
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The research for this thesis revealed other areas that if studied, could benefit the
Government and DoD. The following paragraphs discuss these areas:
1
.
But for the efforts of a handful of Congressmen, the V-22 could very easily
have been politically wounded and have would never have recovered. An in-depth study
of the costs and benefits of political influence on military systems acquisition could
reveal opportunities to enhance or re-engineer the process to optimize system utility.
2. Current acquisition reform principles have been value added. An in-depth
analysis of why this recent effort succeeded and other efforts in the past failed should be
conducted. Process re-engineering models, similar to IDEF, or process change models,
similar to that devised by Richard Bechard, could outline required elements for successful
process change. Causal organizational issues within DoD should be addressed so that
beneficial change can occur in the future.
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3. O&S contingency reprogramming causes instability in acquisition programs.
Starting in FY-2000 DoD will have a reserve available for acquisition executives to
stabilize programs, but this reserve specifically excludes funding for contingency induced
instability. It will only stabilize programs affected by "technical risk." Research into how
to create a new O&S contingency fund would benefit all acquisition programs.
4. The single process initiative (SPI) may not be accomplishing what it was
designed to. How should the single process initiative be altered to reduce acquisition cost
to the Government? An examination of the incentives that are present and how these
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